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Executive Summary  
 
This paper presents a policy-focused report on the research project ‘Progress and 
Problems in Social Housing Estates: A ten-year follow-up study’. The project was carried 
out between late 2007 and early 2009 in seven local authority housing estates in Ireland 
and took the form of a follow-up to a study of the same estates which had been carried out 
in the period 1997-1999. The seven estates examined in the study are: Fatima Mansions 
and Finglas South in Dublin City; Fettercairn, Tallaght, in South County Dublin; Deanrock 
estate in Togher, Cork City; Moyross in Limerick City; Muirhevnamor in Dundalk and 
Cranmore in Sligo town. 
 
Objectives 
The study sought, first, to assess the impact of the recent economic boom on social 
conditions in the seven estates, and second, to examine the growth and significance of 
‘area-based interventions’ as responses to social disadvantage in the estates, taking 
account of national trends in these fields. Area-based interventions are measures which 
direct special resources at neighbourhoods that have been selected on the basis of their 
social disadvantage. An economic downturn had arrived by the final stages of the study, 
but its effects were only beginning to emerge as fieldwork was completed and did not form 
a focus of study.  
 
Change in the estates 
The study found that the combined effect of economic boom and area-based interventions 
on the estates over the study period was, with some exceptions, substantial and positive, 
though at a time when the country as a whole was experiencing rapid economic growth, 
only one estate (Fatima Mansions) improved sufficiently to narrow the gap with the 
national average. Some of the diversity in social conditions within and between estates 
that had been observed in the original study in 1997-99 was reduced by the regeneration 
of worst-off areas (e.g. Fatima Mansions). Other estates developed reasonably well 
without major special programmes (e.g. Fettercairn). However, in some estates crime and 
social order problems persisted and, in one instance (Moyross), these problems worsened 
to the point where they brought a new wave of housing failure in spite of advances on 
other dimensions and a history of strong community development in the locality.  
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For the most part, it is not possible to separate out the effects on the estates of general 
change in social and economic conditions from those of area-based interventions. Some 
interventions left an obvious positive legacy (as in the case of the re-built Fatima 
Mansions), but even in those cases it is difficult to assess which aspects of interventions 
were most important (for example, as between re-building of housing and the upgrading of 
social services), or what role was played by side-effects of the intervention such as the 
displacement of problem residents to other areas.  
 
Area-based interventions: inputs 
One objective of the study was to try to quantify the inputs to area-based interventions, 
both nationally and in the estates in the study. It found that: 
 In 2006 there were 23 national-level programmes that, to varying degrees, could be 
counted as providers of area-based interventions. They accounted for €968.8 million of 
public expenditure, of which €688 million was direct expenditure and €280 million 
consisted of tax breaks for commercial development in run-down urban areas.  
 In the estates in the study, there was no pre-existing information on the overall level of 
expenditure deriving from these programmes. This lack of information on inputs from 
distinct but overlapping interventions in individual neighbourhoods is an important 
issue as it forms a barrier to effective planning and evaluation of these interventions. 
 The study carried out a detailed analysis of area-based interventions operating in 2006 
in four estates: Fatima Mansions, Moyross, Cranmore and Deanrock. It found that 
these interventions were generally multiple and varied and were complex in organ-
isation and funding, though with differences between the estates on these counts. 
 The number of community organisations which received funding in 2006 was 22 in 
Moyross, 16 in Fatima Mansions, 15 in Cranmore and five in Deanrock.  
 The national funding sources that the estate-level organisations drew on were also 
numerous: 17 in Fatima Mansions, 15 in both Moyross and Cranmore, and 11 in 
Deanrock. Twenty-one of the 57 organisations and projects in the four estates drew on 
three or more sources of funding in 2006 and the majority drew on at least two 
sources.  
 In all four estates, community development projects played an important role in 
assisting local organisations to access funding and to handle the complex admin-
istrative tasks that that funding gave rise to. Much of their work was focused on 
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interfacing between community organisations and agencies of the state and this role 
impinged on the resources they could devote to other work in their communities.   
 On a rough estimate, public funding provided by national programmes to these 
interventions in 2006, expressed in per household terms, averaged €3,096 across the 
four estates, ranging from a low of €921 per household in Deanrock to a high of 
€3,985 per household in Moyross. These amounts do not include funding provided 
from sub-national sources (e.g. local authorities) or from philanthropic bodies.  
 The Community Employment scheme is a core element of much of the area-based 
social provision now in place in Ireland and its contribution in that regard should be 
more clearly recognised and incorporated into the rationale for providing it and the 
bases on which it is evaluated. 
 Progress made to date in the provision of intensive, high-quality support services for 
acutely disadvantaged households is one of the most positive developments of the 
past decade in services for disadvantaged areas. The need for these services arises 
particularly in the fields of health, education and criminal justice. Examples of good 
practice in all these areas can now be found in the estates in the present study and 
more widely in Ireland. The challenge is to build on these examples of good practice 
so that they become mainstream and central parts of the social services system rather 
than scattered examples existing on the margins.  
 
Area-based interventions: impact 
This study did not conduct original evaluation of the outcomes of area-based interventions 
but drew on existing evaluations and local observation to reflect on overall impact. 
Evaluations of many individual programmes have found them to be effective in their own 
terms. However, a collective view of programmes gives rise to concerns. The rationale for 
area-targeting of expenditure is not always clear, there is a confusing proliferation of 
programmes and schemes, overall responsibility is fragmented, funding streams and local 
governance arrangements are overly complex, the funding principles they operate are 
often inflexible in the light of local conditions, and while in principle they aim to empower 
communities in practice they are often rigidly controlled by centrally defined eligibility 
criteria and accountability regulations. Some streamlining of programmes has recently 
been introduced (such as the amalgamation of the Community Development and Local 
Social Development programmes into a single Local and Community Development 
programme). Reductions in public expenditure are also likely to impel consolidation, as 
was recommended by the McCarthy report in 2009 (Special Group Public Service 
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Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, 2009) and has been promised in the programme 
for government adopted by the newly elected government in February 2011. Undoubtedly, 
questions of fragmentation in local governance, especially vis-à-vis local authorities, still 
remain. In addition, monitoring of programmes is excessively concerned with inputs and 
processes rather than outcomes. In regard to inputs, monitoring is generally restricted to 
discrete projects and there are no mechanisms for arriving at an overview of what all local 
interventions taken together amount to in particular neighbourhoods. 
Recommendations: 
 Targeting of social programmes by area rather than by population category should be 
utilised only where there is a clear rationale and an effective methodology for 
employing this approach; 
 Interventions in particular areas should be assessed collectively as a response to local 
need and in light of area-wide information on existing publicly-funded inputs and of the 
shortcomings in those inputs which interventions are intended to rectify; 
 Progress has been made in recent years in improving the information-base on social 
need in local areas but the mapping of public service inputs on a small-area basis is 
weak and needs to be developed to the point where it can provide adequate 
contextual information for the planning of additional local interventions.  
 The structure and governance of interventions could be simplified and greater 
responsibility could be given to local authorities in the local coordination and 
management of programmes.  
 Community engagement, local decision-making and local autonomy have been 
enhanced to some degree through area-based interventions, despite continuing 
limitations in local democracy. It is important that gains in these areas are not lost in 
re-institutionalising ABIs. 
 Where spatial targeting is used, programmes should be required to show that they 
have good methods for selecting areas, that they have effective means of identifying 
and reaching the neediest within those areas, and that they can monitor whether and 
to what degree they have actually reached the areas and groups they target. 
 The role played by the acutely disadvantaged in the dynamics of neighbourhood 
decline in poor areas provides an important justification for giving them a high priority 
in service provision, in addition to the justification that arises from the extreme distress 
that they themselves suffer from. 
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 Estate regeneration programmes should avoid excessive focus on capital programmes 
(refurbishment or replacement of dwellings, rehabilitation of the physical environment, 
provision of community buildings) to the neglect of services. The balance between 
capital and current expenditure in area-based regeneration schemes should be based 
on good diagnosis of what is needed in those areas rather than on a priori preference 
for capital or current expenditure. Particular attention should be paid to appropriate 
services for acutely disadvantaged families and individuals which should be regarded 
as central to regeneration schemes rather than as additions at the margins.  
 The Community Employment scheme, which provides job-placements for the long-
term unemployed and other disadvantaged people in order to help them get back to 
work, has become an important source of labour for much area-based social service 
provision in poor neighbourhoods and its role in that regard should be more clearly 
recognised and evaluated. 
 Many examples of intensive, high-quality support services for acutely disadvantaged 
households can be found in disadvantaged areas but these need to be extended more 
fully into the mainstream social services system.  
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1.  Introduction 
  
1.1 Purpose of report 
This document presents a policy-focused summary report on the research project 
‘Progress and Problems in Social Housing Estates: A ten-year follow-up study’. The 
project was carried out between late 2007 and early 2009 in seven local authority housing 
estates in Ireland and took the form of a follow-up to a study of the same estates which 
had been carried out in the period 1997-1999. The original study was directed by the same 
core group of social researchers as the present follow-up [see T. Fahey (ed.) Social 
Housing in Ireland: A study of success, failures and lessons learned, Oak Tree Press, 
Dublin, 1999, for an account of the original study.]  
 
The purpose of the present report is to extract aspects of the findings from the study of 
most relevance to policy makers and make recommendations for policy. It draws from a 
number of research papers on major aspects and strands of the study prepared by the 
members of the project research team. The full set of research papers is being finalised 
and edited for publication as a book-length, integrated academic volume on the study. The 
present summary was compiled by Tony Fahey, Michelle Norris, Des McCafferty and 
Eileen Humphreys but much of the material it contains is taken directly from the research 
papers and other material provided by research team members.  
 
1.2 The original study 
In 1997-1998, a team of social researchers studied social conditions in seven local 
authority housing estates in Ireland – three in the Dublin area and one each in Cork city, 
Limerick city, Sligo town and Dundalk. The study sought to examine and explain the 
differing levels of success of these estates in social and community terms and to draw 
implications for policy, with reference especially to policy on social housing provision and 
management. It paid particular attention to the landlord role of local authority housing 
departments. This focus was adopted in view of a widespread concern at the time that 
poor management of housing estates had contributed to the problems of the sector and 
needed to be rectified. Placing the seven case study estates in the larger context of social 
housing in Ireland, the study found that most local authority housing had been successful 
and had created vibrant neighbourhoods which had merged seamlessly into the general 
fabric of Irish life (as indicated, for example, by the degree to which local authority housing 
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had been privatised through tenant purchase schemes and had experienced strong buyer 
demand in the overall housing market).  
 
The study also found, however, that some estates or portions of estates had failed, in the 
sense that they were in low demand among tenants, had waiting lists of residents who 
wanted to get out, and showed physical signs of neighbourhood decay (defaced and 
boarded-up buildings, rubbish, absence of foliage, etc). Social disadvantage was quite 
widespread among residents in local authority housing estates, but housing failure was 
more spatially concentrated: it was absent or slight in some estates but was a major 
feature of others, and even in the least successful of the estates, there was considerable 
internal micro-variation so that conditions were much worse in some roads or blocks of 
flats than in others within the same estate. While instances of failure, particularly in 
extreme forms, were few in number, they tended to have high social visibility and a 
disproportionately negative impact on the image of local authority housing. In the seven 
estates studied in the project, conditions were representative of these patterns in that, 
alongside widespread and high levels of social disadvantage in general, the quality of the 
neighbourhood environment ranged from the quite good to the quite troubled and did so 
within as well as between estates.  
 
Taking account of general patterns of disadvantage within social housing, the original 
study sought to examine how and why some segments of social housing failed. It found 
that physical factors – the location, build quality, housing type and size of estates – were of 
secondary significance and that social factors were the primary proximate influence. As a 
general rule, people were willing to live in poor buildings if the quality of community and 
neighbourhood life was good, but they were unwilling to live in good buildings if they 
considered the quality of community/neighbourhood life to be poor.  
 
The core factors that defined the quality of community and neighbourhood life for residents 
had to do with various aspects of social order – the degree to which estates or parts of 
estates were disrupted by noisy or unruly neighbours, vandalism, joy-riding, harassment, 
drug dealing, petty criminality, and so on. The typical view of residents in locations most 
affected by these factors was that while community was strong and supportive in the area, 
the social quality of the locality was undermined by small groups of highly disruptive 
neighbours. Residents considered that they suffered doubly from the disruptive minority – 
first, because they were often the direct victims of their actions, and second because the 
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disruptive few undermined the reputation of estates and gave rise to a stigma which 
affected all residents equally. While the distinction drawn by residents between the ‘sound’ 
majority and the few disruptive troublemakers undoubtedly oversimplified reality, it never-
theless seemed to capture an important part of the dynamic of decline in unsuccessful 
estates. 
 
While the majority of residents often considered themselves the victims of troublemaking 
minorities within estates, those troublemakers, viewed from a different perspective, often 
emerged as victims themselves. They typically came from dysfunctional family back-
grounds or suffered from problems such as mental illness, personality disorders, drug or 
alcohol dependence or a persistent history of personal failure and low self esteem. They 
thus had needs and entitlements that needed to be taken into account in devising 
remedies for problem estates. 
 
The study concurred with the criticisms of the historically poor estate management record 
of local authorities but also found that moves towards a more hands-on responsive 
management approach had been in place since the early 1990s. The impact of that 
development had not become evident by the time the study was carried out.  
 
The conclusions and recommendations of the study highlighted the need for social 
housing policy and practice to focus on social order issues and move them to the top of 
the agenda in efforts to regenerate problem estates. It pointed in particular to the need to 
put in place both preventive and treatment measures that would target those who were the 
cause of disruption and provide them with the supports and controls that would enable 
them to integrate more effectively into the community. However, it also emphasised the 
importance of not overstating the prevalence or severity of social problems in local 
authority housing, in view of the large segments of the social housing sector where these 
problems were absent or slight. 
 
1.3 Rationale for the follow-up study 
In the ten years after the original study was carried out there were two major strands of 
change that are likely to have affected the seven estates. One was the boom in the Irish 
economy that took off around 1994-95 and was only beginning to affect the estates when 
the original study began in 1997. During this boom, which lasted until 2007, Ireland had 
among the fastest growth rates in the developed world and moved from high 
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unemployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s to virtually full employment by 2007. As 
these developments unfolded, a number of  questions arose including  to what degree  the 
benefits had filtered into poorer neighbourhoods, including our study estates, and what 
could be learned from their experience about the effects of rising national prosperity on 
deprived urban areas generally.  
 
The second key development was the growing reliance in public policy on area-based 
interventions as a means to alleviate disadvantage and promote social and economic 
progress in deprived areas. This development was common to many countries and 
reflected a widespread international view that characteristics of poor places as well as 
poor people needed to be taken account of and tackled by anti-poverty policy. In the social 
housing field it coincided with a widespread international shift away from new build to 
regeneration of existing run-down estates. In Ireland, the interest in area-targeted 
measures expanded from the early 1990s and gave rise to a large and diverse range of 
programmes originating in a number of government departments and agencies. While 
these programmes have generally been closely monitored from a rule compliance 
viewpoint and some have been subjected to outcome assessment, the usual practice in 
monitoring has been to focus on inputs and processes rather than outcomes and to look at 
programmes individually rather than at their collective scale and impact. In fact, schemes 
of this type have proliferated to the point where they now encompass a wide array of 
activities that are difficult to list and count, much less view in an integrated way. This 
background led to a view in this study that it would be useful first to provide a national 
overview of the scale and nature of area-based anti-poverty programmes in Ireland (a 
bird’s eye view at a national level) and, against that background, to provide a local 
perspective on what these programmes amounted to in the seven study estates (a local-
level view of what they mean on the ground).  
 
Prompted by interest in these issues, core members of the same team that had carried out 
the original study re-assembled in 2007 in order to design and carry out a ten-year follow-
up study of the same seven estates. Additional members were subsequently added to the 
team (see below). Design work and the securing of funding took place in the latter part of 
2007, field work was carried out in 2008 and early 2009, and analysis and write-up 
extended through the first half of 2009.  
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1.4 Aims and design of follow-up study  
The seven estates examined in the original study were: Fatima Mansions and Finglas 
South in Dublin City Council area; Fettercairn, Tallaght, in South County Dublin; Deanrock 
estate in Togher, Cork City; Moyross in Limerick City; Muirhevnamor in Dundalk and 
Cranmore in Sligo town. The overall aim of the follow-up study was to assess the nature 
and impact of the socio-economic and policy developments outlined in the previous 
section on these estates, viewed in national context, and to draw implications for policy. 
The thoroughness of the assessment that was possible was limited by various data 
limitations, particularly the absence of rigorous, comprehensive data on social trends in the 
seven estates and the lack of appropriate controls that would enable the impact of various 
factors to be isolated. Nevertheless, sufficient information, both quantitative and 
qualitative, was available to enable us to outline major features of change and to add 
substantially to our knowledge of how area-based initiatives operated in Ireland and more 
particularly in the study estates. The period which the study sought to encompass 
consisted of the decade between 1997-99 and 2007-09, though it drew on Census data for 
1996 and 2006 for monitoring social change in the estates over the period.  
 
The recent sharp downturn in the economy had become evident by mid-2008, part way 
through the fieldwork for the study, though the scale of that downturn did not become clear 
until the end of that year and the beginning of 2009. This downturn means that the study 
estates are now located in a very different national and international context than that 
which obtained over the previous ten years. The boom is definitely over and a recession 
that might endure for some time is now fully arrived. The present study has persisted with 
its main aims despite these changed circumstances: it still focuses primarily on the boom 
years and the effects of rising national prosperity and growth in area-based initiatives on 
the study estates. However, it has also sought to draw out lessons for policy on 
disadvantaged areas in the present, very different, circumstances, where living standards 
are under pressure, unemployment has soared again, and social spending programmes 
are facing cutbacks. All of these circumstances point to the possibility not only that social 
disadvantage in general will worsen in poor neighbourhoods, but also that a new wave of 
housing failures could arise in particularly vulnerable areas, thereby adding an additional 
layer of disadvantage onto those areas. Although the present study cannot present any 
information on the effects of the changed economic and fiscal circumstances on the study 
estates, the lessons it contains on interventions that helped improve conditions in those 
areas during the good times can be useful as the need for effective interventions increases 
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in the more challenging years ahead, even as the funding available to pay for them 
shrinks.  
 
The study sought to fulfil the aims set out above by means of a two-stranded approach – a 
social strand focusing on socio-economic change in the estates and a policy strand which 
aimed to document and analyse public interventions in the estates, particularly those that 
could be classified as area-based interventions. The specific objectives of these two 
strands were as follows.   
 
Strand 1: economic boom and socio-economic change in the estates 
1. Document change in social conditions in the study estates under a number of 
headings: employment, unemployment and living standards; housing standards and 
the built environment; social order; family, quality of life and general well-being, 
neighbourhood and community; relationships with state agencies 
2. Locate these changes within broader social and economic trends in urban areas in 
Ireland. 
 
The methods used for this strand consisted of qualitative assessment and direct observation 
of social conditions in the seven estates, complemented by analysis of aggregate statistical 
data in order to locate the estates in their wider social context. Particular use is made of the 
Small Area Population Statistics (SAPS) from censuses 1996 and 2006 both to describe the 
local urban context of the individual study estates and to track changes in patterns of 
deprivation in Irish urban areas in general. In some of our estates, the area units for which 
SAPS data were available (Electoral Divisions, EDs) closely matched estate boundaries, 
and in others, the SAPS area units were larger than the estates. In the latter cases, this 
exercise had value in revealing trends in the wider neighbourhoods in which estates were 
located.  
 
At the suggestion of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 
one of the funders of the study, it was agreed that, in view of the often intensive consultation 
and data collection that has occurred in many local authority estates over recent years, any 
new collection of data from residents in the estates should be limited and should be confined 
to situations where the required information was not already available from other sources. 
The study would concentrate, rather, on drawing together all the existing reports and 
compilations of information already generated on the estates, and on national programmes 
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that were relevant to them, and would use these as the major sources for assessing social 
conditions and policy impacts in the estates. These sources would then be complemented 
by a number of additional types of data, namely: 
a) local observation and resource inventories, including photographic recording of the local 
environment;  
b) interviews with key informants such as local community activists, local officials, gardaí, 
clergy, etc; 
c) analysis of local official records and data, where available and accessible (e.g. 
evaluations of estate regeneration or community development schemes, documents 
arising from community initiatives such as regeneration consultations, oral histories, local 
surveys of health and well-being, etc.)  
 
Strand 2: The nature, scale and impact of local area-based interventions 
The policy strand of the study sought to outline the growth of international interest in area-
based anti-poverty initiatives since the 1960s, provide a national overview of these 
initiatives in Ireland, trace their presence and significance in the study estates, and draw 
conclusions on their value for combating social disadvantage. At the national level in 
Ireland, the challenge this objective posed was to delimit what could be counted as area-
based anti-poverty initiatives and quantify their total scale. To that end, the study took the 
year 2006 as the reference year and sought to assemble information on the design and 
expenditure of all national programmes that could be counted as area-based and as 
having an anti-poverty focus. It thereby sought to arrive at a bird’s-eye view of this whole 
field of activity in Ireland in the year 2006. In the counterpart examination of the study 
estates, the goal was to provide a local view of the same field in the same year though, as 
we shall see below, the impact of certain regional and local programmes, along with 
contributions from private philanthropy, meant that what happened on the ground in 
estates was not simply a local reflection of national programmes. The complexity of estate-
level activity and the difficulty in assembling comprehensive, accurate information on 
relevant schemes were such that the team decided to focus intensively on four of the 
seven estates – two that clearly had high levels of intervention, and two where relevant 
initiatives were fewer in number. The analysis of programmes in these estates then 
proceeded through four steps:  
i.  Compile a detailed inventory of interventions – i.e. identify and classify every 
substantial area-based programme in any way related to alleviating disadvantage that 
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was implemented in the study estates or that reached significant populations within the 
estates. The main focus was on programmes that received at least some public 
funding. Programmes funded by private philanthropy were also found in some estates, 
but as the accuracy and completeness of information on philanthropic supports were 
uncertain, they are only partly integrated into the analysis.  
ii. Quantify the inputs associated with each programme, particularly expenditure, and 
sum them to arrive at an estimate of total inputs per estate and per household in each 
estate; 
iii.  Examine the outputs of the programmes and in so far as the data allow, comment on 
these; 
iv. In so far as possible, examine the question of programme impact. In view of the 
number and variety of activities involved, the study could not provide formal impact 
assessment. Nevertheless, it seemed possible to offer some comment on the impact 
of all initiatives viewed together, if only by assessing their overall scale and fit with the 
kinds of problems in the estates they sought to address.  
 
1.5 Consultative Committee  
With the assistance of the Combat Poverty Agency (now incorporated into the Social 
Inclusion Division of the Department of Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs), the 
initial funding agency to offer support for the study, a Consultative Committee for the project 
was established and met periodically to offer guidance on the design and implementation of 
the study. 
 Kasey Treadwell-Shine (Combat Poverty Agency – chairperson) 
 Eddie Lewis (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government) 
 Sinéad Pentony (Pobal) 
 Jerry Byrne (Dublin City Council) 
 Donal Guerin (Cork City Council) 
 
1.6 Research team 
The final research team for the study was drawn from a number of institutions and 
consisted of the following: 
UCD:  Tony Fahey (coordinator), Michelle Norris, Catherine-Anne Field, Aileen 
O’Gorman 
NUIM:  Mary Corcoran 
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UCC:  Cathal O’Connell, Joe Finnerty, Alan Egan 
UL/Mary Immaculate College: Des McCafferty, Eileen Humphreys, Eoin Devereaux, 
Amanda Haynes, Martin Power 
Sligo IT: Perry Share, Jackie O’Toole 
Independent:  Trutz Haase. 
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2 National and international policy context 
 
2.1 Social housing policy 
The neighbourhoods which are the focus of this study originated as local authority housing 
estates. It was already the case when we studied these estates ten years ago that much of 
the housing had been privatised through tenant purchase. Also, the growth of area-
targeted schemes has meant that the range of local agencies that are relevant to life within 
the estates has extended well beyond the local authorities in recent years. Yet, these 
estates continue to draw much of their identity and character from their origins in the social 
housing system and from the continuing relationship which many residents have with local 
authorities as landlords. Even former tenants who have bought out their homes often still 
think of themselves and their neighbourhoods as having a link with local authority housing 
departments. This link would be absent in housing estates originating in the private sector. 
It is therefore relevant to locate the present study in the context of developments in social 
housing policy. 
 
Like many other elements of the welfare state, the social housing sector has contracted in 
many countries in the past two decades as cuts in state capital funding have reduced new 
housing output (Stephens et al, 2002). In some cases, such as the UK, Germany and the 
Netherlands, reduced state funding has been paralleled by various privatization and 
externalisation measures, such as increased reliance on private sector funding, sales of 
dwellings to tenants and transfer of ownership or responsibility for management services 
for the housing stock to alternative providers (Gibb, 2002). Low income and often multiply 
disadvantaged households are now more heavily concentrated in social housing than was 
traditionally the case (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2007). The regulatory environment has 
also changed, though in different ways in different countries. In many cases, reduced 
government funding has increased the management autonomy of social landlords (Gruis 
and Nieboer, 2007). However, in the UK, government has subjected social housing 
providers to greater monitoring, evaluation and regulation and has used both financial 
incentives and legal enforcement to shape their behaviour (Cowan and McDermont, 2006).  
 
At the time of the original study of the seven estates in 1997-99 the bulk of dwellings in the 
social housing sector in Ireland (that is, apart from those that had been sold to tenants) 
were owned and managed by local authorities. The latter, as landlords, had traditionally 
focused on property management rather than tenant welfare. They had operated with a 
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hierarchical, rule-based, desk-bound culture and a centralised approach to service delivery 
(O’Connell, 1999). Although relatively benign and paternalistic, this culture involved 
minimal interaction with tenants and no partnership or consultation. In addition, in contrast 
to practice in the majority of EU states, rents were linked to the income of tenants and bore 
no relation to the costs of providing, managing and maintaining dwellings (Scanlon and 
Whitehead, 2007). Our study of ten years ago revealed widespread indifference or even 
hostility towards local authority housing departments among tenants in estates. Despite 
this and the high rate of poverty among the tenants, a number of the seven estates 
accommodated vibrant, successful communities. The study at that time also found 
examples of able and committed local authority housing managers who had begun to 
develop innovative practice and to engage closely with residents and community groups 
on estates (O’Connell and Fahey, 1999; Guerin, 1999). 
 
In the decade since then, developments in Irish social housing policy and management 
have in some ways echoed wider European trends and in other ways have remained 
distinctive. The role of non-profit housing associations has grown, albeit less dramatically 
than in the UK. In 1997, non-profit housing associations provided 15 per cent of social 
housing in Ireland (approximately 15,000 dwellings), and this rose to 18.6 per cent (25,442 
dwellings) by 2006 (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 
various years; Mullins et al, 2003). The Plan for Social Housing in 1991 had sought 
improved management standards in local authority housing and from the late 1990s a 
plethora of measures to achieve this were put in place (Norris and O’Connell, 2002). 
Recommendations made in the 1996 policy statement Better Local Government further 
encouraged more strategic, participative and evidence-based management in local 
authority housing (Department of the Environment, 1996).  
 
One unusual feature of social housing in Ireland is that until recently, the Irish government 
has funded 100 per cent of the capital cost of social housing construction. This funding 
increased sharply after 1997 with output doubling in the following decade (Department of 
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, various years). However, severe 
contractions in social housing output in the previous decade meant that the base from 
which this increase occurred was low and the absolute contribution of the social sector to 
housing supply during the economic boom was relatively small.  
 
23 
 
A more significant development in this period was the growing reliance on rent subsidies 
for welfare dependent households in the private rented sector as a form of quasi-social 
housing support. Starting from a low base in the late 1980s, when the state spent less than 
€10 million on rent supplements, spending on this form of support rose to almost €70 
million by the mid-1990s and ballooned to €440 million by 2008. In the latter year, 74,000 
households received rent supplements, which was the equivalent of about two-thirds the 
population of households in social housing proper. In 2005 government announced that in 
future most rent supplement claimants of 18 months or more duration would be 
accommodated in dwellings leased by local authorities from private landlords; and in 2008 
it announced that all new social housing will be procured by leasing dwellings from the 
private sector (Norris and Coates, 2010)  This means that the private rental sector now 
makes a key contribution to accommodating less well-off households that were formerly 
housed mainly by social landlords. This approach is to the fore in housing some new 
disadvantaged categories such as immigrants and in the future is likely to play an even 
greater role in this regard (Fahey and Fanning, 2010). Future studies of disadvantaged 
housing areas in Irish towns and cities will need to take account of this fact and extend 
their scope beyond the traditional social housing sector. In addition, lessons about housing 
for the poor learned from the study of social housing will need to be adapted to apply to 
disadvantaged housing in the private sector.  
 
2.2 Area-based interventions: origins and policies 
Area-based social inclusion measures entail the application of resources, both public and 
private, to specific geographical areas, as opposed to particular sectors of society, in order 
to alleviate disadvantage. Such measures first emerged in Europe in the 1960s and were 
initially inspired by the example of American efforts to tackle the ghettoisation of racial 
minorities in deprived and marginalised neighbourhoods in US cities. Similarly, the first UK 
intervention – the Urban Programme – was developed in England in the late 1960s in 
response to the growing evidence of urban decay in inner cities and fears of social unrest 
and ethnic tension (Parkinson, 1996). In both Europe and America these programmes 
have expanded significantly since then, driven by concerns about urban problems and, in 
Europe, by the availability of EU funding for area-based interventions. 
 
Measures of this kind first emerged in Ireland in the 1980s when unemployment was high, 
especially long-term unemployment, and means of tackling ‘unemployment blackspots’ 
were sought. The Third EU Poverty Programme (1989-94) set up pilot schemes with a 
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broad anti-poverty focus, and from this emerged the Area-Based Response to Long-Term 
Unemployment, followed in 1994-98 by schemes under the EU’s Urban Initiative in North 
Dublin, Tallaght and Cork. The first area programme for Integrated Rural Development 
(1988-90), which was established by the Department of Agriculture in twelve pilot areas 
with a particular focus on community and local enterprise (Walsh et al, 1998), was 
developed to respond to these problems.  
 
From these measures local ‘partnership companies’ emerged. Twenty of these were 
established to target urban neighbourhoods and 18 were set up for rural areas. The rural 
partnerships were generally known as ‘Leader partnerships’ because they were the 
institutional mechanism used at local level to administer the EU-funded Leader Initiative 
with the objective to promote bottom-up rural development. In addition, 33 community 
groups emerged to carry out similar work in small towns outside the large concentrations 
of disadvantage targeted by the partnerships (Walsh et al, 1998). The number of these 
organisations grew during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, rising to over 90 partnership 
and Leader companies by the middle of the 2000s. These local partnership companies are 
non-statutory agencies, managed by representatives of government, business and the 
third sector, which are tasked with devising multi-dimensional plans to address spatial 
concentrations of disadvantage. They focus especially on (1) combating long-term 
unemployment; (2) assisting the development of local economic and employment projects, 
particularly by promoting social economy projects and entrepreneurs within low-income 
communities; and (3) supporting more traditional community development projects, 
particularly for vulnerable groups (Teague, 2006). This remit is implemented principally by 
providing grant aid to relevant local community based organisations and also through 
support for these organisations from partnership staff. In response to concerns about the 
proliferation and fragmentation of diverse local development activities, the government 
initiated a ‘local Cohesion Process’ in 2004, the purpose of which was to achieve greater 
integration of local development companies, align their area boundaries with those of local 
authorities and provide more complete coverage of disadvantaged areas. This process 
was slow to evolve, but to date it has resulted in the reduction of partnership and Leader 
companies from over 90 to 54.  
 
Another major area-based initiative was the Community Development Programme, which 
was introduced in the early 1990s to fund community development resource centres in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It emerged from funding schemes for interventions of this 
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type which were initiated in the early 1980s and which grew into the principal source of 
revenue for community development activity in Ireland (Ó Cinnéide and Walsh, 1990; 
Geoghegan and Powell, 2006). By 2009 there were some 180 community development 
projects around the country, but as the condition of the public finances worsened in 2009, 
their number was reduced to 164 in 2010. Partly in response to financial pressures arising 
from the recent fiscal crisis and partly in order to rationalise provision, two major local 
development programmes – the Community Development Programme and the funding 
programme for the partnerships (Local Development Social Inclusion Programme) – were 
integrated into a single programme in 2010.  This new programme, called the Local and 
Community Development Programme, will be implemented by non-profit agencies called 
Local Development Companies (LDCs), which in most cases have developed from the 
amalgamation of Community Development Projects and Partnerships.  The operational 
area of the 54 LDCs will cover the country as a whole, although within these areas their 
work will focus on disadvantaged neighbourhoods and groups. 
 
The most significant social benefit that emerged as the economy took off in the 1990s was 
the reduction in unemployment and in particular long-term unemployment. Nevertheless, 
concentrations of unemployment persisted in some localities, albeit at lower levels than 
previously, and some urban neighbourhoods continued to display patterns of cumulative 
disadvantage. Economic and labour market interventions (job search, training for the 
unemployed, addressing low educational qualification, small-scale enterprise 
development) have therefore remained a central focus of many area-based interventions, 
particularly the local partnership companies. Some area-based measures, such as the 
Local Employment Service, have also sought to support the long-term unemployed to 
access jobs. The Community Employment and Jobs Initiatives schemes have also had 
additional neighbourhood-level benefits because the work placements they provide for the 
long-term unemployed have served as an important source of staff for community 
services. Poor neighbourhoods have gained disproportionately from these benefits since 
they are prioritised in the allocation of resources under these schemes (Geoghegan and 
Powell, 2006). 
 
From the mid-1990s, mirroring the trend in the UK, the scope of area-based initiatives 
expanded beyond the early focus on job training and employment initiatives to include 
issues such as family breakdown, lone parenthood, child behavioural problems, drug 
abuse, crime and anti-social behaviour, and the high incidence of health problems among 
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disadvantaged sub-groups in the population. Examples of such new programmes which 
emerged in Ireland in this period include Springboard and Family Resource Centres in the 
area of family support, the Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme and the National 
Childcare Investment Programme in child care, and the Youth Diversion Programme, the 
Young People’s Facilities and Services Fund and Special Projects to Assist 
Disadvantaged Youth in youth work. 
 
While the area-based initiatives just outlined were wholly new and grew up external to the 
existing mainstream social services, there was also a category of interventions which 
overlapped with mainstream services and were ‘area-based’ in that they sought to ‘bend’ 
mainstream services to favour poor neighbourhoods. For instance, from 1984 eight 
separate programmes to provide pre-school services and grant aid to schools serving a 
disadvantaged student body were put in place. Following a review in 2005, these were 
integrated under a single support programme for qualifying schools called Delivering 
Equality of Opportunity in Schools (DEIS) (Department of Education and Science, 2005). 
Similarly the Remedial Works Scheme was established in 1985 to fund the regeneration of 
run-down social housing estates. In 2001 two new area-based measures were established 
which similarly focused on channelling existing mainstream funding towards 
disadvantaged areas – RAPID (Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and 
Development), which is responsible for urban areas, and CLÁR (Ceantair Laga Árd-
Riachtanais), for rural areas. These programmes seek to promote local development 
planning and have small amounts of new funding to improve the physical, social and 
community infrastructure of the target areas. However, their main remit is to increase the 
attention given to poor neighbourhoods in the allocation of mainstream government 
funding (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2006).  
 
All of the area-based measures just mentioned have an anti-poverty character in that they 
target expenditure or services on poor areas with the intention that the resulting benefits 
flow directly to poor households in those areas. There is another category of measures 
which are also directed at disadvantaged neighbourhoods and have a certain anti-poverty 
character but which do not seek to benefit poor households directly. These programmes 
seek to improve conditions in poor neighbourhoods by increasing the general level of 
investment in those areas so as to draw in stronger businesses and services or a higher 
proportion of residents with secure jobs and incomes. In Ireland, the main examples of 
such initiatives were the Urban Renewal Scheme, the Town and Village Renewal Scheme 
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and the Rural Renewal Scheme. These schemes provided tax breaks to owner occupiers 
and landlords who purchased new or refurbished residential or business premises in 
designated urban and rural areas. The schemes thus operated on the basis of tax revenue 
forgone rather than actual expenditure. Disadvantaged households were generally unable 
to participate in such schemes since they would lack the incomes to benefit from tax 
breaks or to acquire borrowings for investment (Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2005). 
Yet these measures could indirectly improve the lot of poor households in poor 
neighbourhoods by improving the physical and socio-economic profile of the locality, 
bringing in new services and amenities and generally reducing their isolation from 
mainstream society.              
 
2.3 Rationale for area-based interventions 
As area-based programmes proliferated, the range of rationales for adopting spatial 
targeting as a basis for social service delivery has also grown. None of these rationales is 
uncontested and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether area-targeting of social 
and welfare services can offer any real advantages over more traditional social inclusion 
measures which target sections of the population rather than territorial units. It is useful to 
note what these rationales are in order to recognise their influence in the Irish context, 
while also noting the doubts that arise as to whether the thinking on which they are based 
is valid in this context. 
 
One important rationale for area-based interventions is that, if poverty is concentrated 
spatially, then confining interventions to the worst affected areas offers ‘efficiency’ and 
‘completeness’ in reaching poor individuals (Turnstall and Lupton, 2003). A rationale along 
these lines became stronger in Ireland in the 1980s due to changes in the geography of 
poverty, including the emergence of unemployment ‘blackspots’ as well as spatial 
concentrations of vulnerable groups such as drug addicts and lone parents (Walsh, 1999). 
However, for this justification to hold, both the rate and the incidence of poverty in the 
targeted areas must be high. In other words, most of the population in these areas must be 
poor, and most of the poor must live in them. The lower the rate of poverty in the 
designated areas, the greater the number of unintended beneficiaries that will be included 
(inefficiency in targeting); on the other hand the lower the incidence of poverty, the fewer 
poor people who will be included (incompleteness). This problem with area-based 
targeting has been recognised for a long time. For example, Townsend (1979: 560) 
pointed out that, in Britain, ‘however we care to define economically or socially deprived 
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areas, unless we include over half the areas in the country, there will be more poor 
persons or poor children living outside of them than in them’. 
 
It has been argued that the geography of poverty in Ireland, and specifically the low 
incidence of poor households in relatively high-risk areas is such that spatial targeting is 
inefficient and incomplete (Watson et al, 2005). The targeting rationale is also undermined 
somewhat by the relatively dispersed settlement pattern. In disadvantaged rural areas, 
poverty tends to be widely dispersed and characterised by problems of under-employment 
(rather than concentrated unemployment), social isolation in a context of population 
decline and demographic imbalance, poor infrastructure, and poor accessibility to services. 
Hence, several commentators argue that however useful the area-based approach may be 
in urban areas, it is inappropriate in the rural environment. 
 
Closely linked to the targeting rationale for area-based interventions is a rationing rationale 
which justifies the provision of funds to certain areas and the exclusion of others on 
grounds of scarcity of resources. According to Walsh (1999), this was an important 
consideration in the initial development of area-based initiatives in Ireland in the 1980s, 
when (as is the case again now) there were severe constraints on public expenditure. 
Rationing may be primarily motivated either by a desire to close the gap in living standards 
and opportunities between poorer and wealthier areas (i.e., re-distribution consideration) 
or, alternatively, in order to maximise the return on investment (an efficiency argument). 
Depending on the relative weight given to these two considerations, designation of areas 
for funding purposes will be based on needs (in the case of a redistribution focus) or on 
criteria such as the area’s potential or capacity to deliver a programme and absorb the 
available funding available (an efficiency focus). Where there is an efficiency focus, 
potential and capacity to benefit are typically assessed on the basis of competitive bidding 
and the production of strategies and action plans – with the consequences that the most 
disadvantaged areas may be marginalised from the process and gain little benefit (Tunstall 
and Lupton, 2003).  
 
A third rationale for area-based interventions relates to the widely researched 
phenomenon of neighbourhood or area effects. These refer to the cumulative and 
qualitatively different effects for people, infrastructure and organisations arising from the 
concentration of poverty at neighbourhood level (Tunstall and Lupton, 2003; Watson et al, 
2005). Here, the idea is that it is worse to be poor in a poor area than in a mixed area and 
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that living among poor neighbours compounds the disadvantage arising from one’s own 
poverty (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001). Problems sometimes said to be linked to area 
effects include lower incomes, higher rates of physical and mental ill-health, deficiencies in 
child development, behavioural problems in children, and alienation from mainstream 
society. In addition, as Kleinman (1999) points out, negative externalities arising from 
concentrated deprivation (e.g., more crime) can also impact on the wider society. 
According to this line of argument, it is appropriate to respond to people-based poverty by 
providing resources to households through such mechanisms as social welfare payments, 
childcare, and housing, but area effects mean that these measures may not be enough to 
change the trajectory of places characterised by concentrated poverty. As we will see 
later, there is no consensus that neighbourhood effects are as significant as some would 
argue, but nevertheless they have been pointed to as a justification for additional 
interventions at the area level to support individuals and families, organisations 
(businesses, public institutions, voluntary bodies) and infrastructure (Tunstall and Lupton, 
2003; Watson et al, 2005).  
 
The fourth rationale for area-based interventions relates to small-scale piloting of 
innovations in the design and delivery of programmes, which also tied into notions of 
localism as an advantage in efforts to tackle local problems. Here, the potential to develop 
good models which by-passed the rigidities of existing local government but could 
subsequently be mainstreamed in policy and practice is often a criterion for funding over 
and above that which might arise from level of need or development potential in a 
neighbourhood. In Ireland, area-based initiatives based on local development partnerships 
were conceived initially, at least in part, in these terms. The importance of innovation as an 
objective of area-based initiatives was strongly influenced by the availability of EU funding 
for local development from the late 1980s. All EU Community Initiatives included a 
requirement for innovation in policy or practice as a criterion for funding. This emphasis 
arose in part from a view in central government (particularly the Department of the 
Taoiseach) that central decision-making was too remote and local government too 
inflexible to resolve intractable local social problems (Haase and McKeown, 2003). By 
allowing local communities to experiment with employment creation and anti-poverty 
actions outside of the constraints of existing structures, the hope was that both central and 
local administration could learn from their experience and adapt mainstream programmes 
accordingly. The Local Employment Service, for instance, was piloted in this way and 
subsequently mainstreamed. However, while Sable’s (1996) review of local partnership 
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companies in Ireland highly lauded their innovative capacity, other studies have 
questioned the extent of learning that these initiatives produced (Haase and McKeown, 
2003).  
 
A fifth rationale for area-based initiatives is that they can improve the effectiveness of anti-
poverty policy by integrating and co-ordinating public services at local level and by making 
them more responsive to local conditions. The argument here in part is that stand-alone 
policies in discrete areas such as education, health, housing or labour market up-skilling 
do not respond to the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and need to break out of the ‘silo 
approach’ that keeps them apart. In Ireland, mechanisms have been set up at national 
level to coordinate the government’s social inclusion agenda (e.g., the National Anti-
Poverty and Social Inclusion Strategy 2007-2016 and the Office for Social Inclusion), but 
there is a view that area-based approaches at local level are also needed to achieve 
coordination in on-the-ground delivery. Examples where this thinking has been applied 
include the integration of enterprise support with training and the integration of training, 
personal development and job search with support for childcare and parenting. The area-
based approach has also been thought of as a way of counterbalancing the highly 
centralised system of design and funding found in mainstream policy areas such as health, 
education, and welfare and as a means to customise programmes to local needs and 
provide more flexibility and speed in responses (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1989). However, from the earliest days of these programmes, instances of 
successful local integration have been hard to find and the more common view is that they 
have simply added further to the stock of discrete local activities. Part of the problem here 
has been the retention of centralised accountability at programme level which inhibits the 
scope for local adaptation and integration with activities from other programmes (Haase 
and McKeown 2003; Walsh et al, 2005).  
 
A final aspect of area-based programmes is their role in mobilising local potential through 
community development and in empowering the poor by including them in decision-
making. From the inception of local partnerships in Ireland, central government, through 
the Department of the Taoiseach, viewed them as having an important role in promoting 
participative democracy and in complementing representative democracy as exercised 
through the electoral system (Sable, 1996). In more recent times in Ireland and other 
countries, government emphasis on community development has shifted somewhat 
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towards concerns with volunteering and active citizenship, but area-based initiatives 
continue to be identified as a key means to secure these objectives. 
 
2.4 Evaluations of area-based interventions  
Provision for evaluation is included in the funding and design of many area-based 
initiatives and was a requirement in all EU-supported programmes. As a result these 
measures have been subject to more extensive scrutiny than many mainstream public 
services. However, most of the evaluations that have emerged as a result have limited 
value in that they focus on inputs and processes rather than outcomes or, if outcomes-
oriented, are methodologically weak. They frequently lack good baseline data, rely heavily 
on opinions gleaned from stakeholders, or in instances where there is good before-and-
after measurement, lack control groups which would indicate what might have happened in 
the absence of intervention.  As a result many of these evaluations have failed to reach 
robust conclusions about the value of the ABIs. This is not unique to ABIs in Ireland but 
has also been highlighted with regard to ABIs in the UK, such as Single Regeneration 
Budget (Rhodes, et al, 2005; O’Reilly, 2007); and for diffuse, complex interventions such 
as those commonly found in community development, international evidence as to ‘what 
works’ is generally weak (Bamber et al. 2009: 5). This reflects the particular challenges 
associated with evaluating complex, community interventions. 
 
In Ireland, a weak record of evaluation has been found particularly in major programmes of 
local development and local social inclusion (key evaluations include Honohan, 1997; ESF 
Evaluation Unit, 1999; Haase and McKeown, 2003; Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2007). On 
the one hand, evaluations typically recognised that organisations such as partnership 
companies and community development programmes often did a great deal of work and 
that at least some of this work could be said on an anecdotal basis to have had clear local 
benefits (e.g., Honohan, 1997:70; Haase and McKeown, 2003:8-13, Fitzpatrick and 
Associates, 2007). Overall, however, there were repeated expressions of concern about a 
number of persistent features of these programmes. These included:  
 the confusing proliferation of local development organisations through which funding 
was delivered and the consequent difficulty of keeping track of what they were doing 
or of what they thought their role was;  
 their weak integration into existing local government and local social services;  
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 their tendency to shift away from innovation, advocacy and local empowerment (their 
original primary remit) into direct service provision;  
 where useful innovation did occur, the lack of mechanisms for translating the benefits 
and lessons learned into mainstream services (for a summary of evaluations on these 
issues, see Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2007:16-21).  
 
The tendency to shift from innovation and ‘bending’ mainstream programmes into direct 
services provision may be linked, in part, to pressure to show outputs and outcomes in the 
monitoring and evaluation of local interventions.   
 
One of the most persistent and serious difficulties these evaluations identified was the lack 
of mechanisms for assessing the impact of programmes. This theme was strongly voiced, 
for example, by Haase and McKeown, who called for ‘a fundamental rethinking of the 
whole monitoring framework’ (Haase and McKeown, 2003:37) and was reiterated by 
Fitzpatrick and Associates (2007). The latter noted that, although €7.3 million had been 
allocated to performance monitoring in the Local Development and Social Inclusion 
Programme for the period 2000-06 (which accounted for 2.6 per cent of total expenditure 
on the programme – Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2007:78), it was still difficult to identify 
what had been achieved by the partnership companies responsible for its delivery: 
 
[T]he greatest weakness of the Partnership experiment is lack of ability to state 
definitively in an evidence-based manner, after 15 years of implementation, what 
impact they have had as a programme on the communities in which they are 
established. Evaluators have generally concluded that, while there is no doubt that the 
areas have developed over time, it is more difficult to demonstrate what the 
Partnership’s distinct contribution has been over and above what might have occurred 
anyway because of economic growth or other interventions (Fitzpatrick and 
Associates, 2007:23). 
 
The McCarthy report, compiled in 2009 to provide a guide to cutbacks in public 
expenditure in the face of the current fiscal crisis, highlighted problems of proliferation of 
non-statutory local social organisations  which supported policy implementation at local 
level (it counted 870 such organisations, although not all of these had a specific remit to 
serve disadvantaged areas) as well as a lack of evidence on their impact (Special Group 
on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 2009, Vol 1:17-18, Vol II:37-9). 
It proposed a radical consolidation of both local and national delivery systems (mainly, at 
local level, by encouraging mergers of organisations and devolving disbursement of 
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funding to local authorities, and at national level, by abolishing one of the government 
departments involved in administering these programmes and merging its functions into 
other departments). It also recommended that the number of programmes be reduced, in 
light of the lack of demonstrated impact of the total package of programmes (Special 
Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 2009, Vol I:17-18, Vol 
II:37-9). More recently, the programme for government adopted by the new government 
following the general election in February 2007 has promised to integrate community 
development and enterprise supports into local government but details on what this will 
entail have yet to emerge (Government of Ireland, 2011). 
 
In terms of specific area-based initiatives (as opposed to the more institutionalised 
mechanism of the local partnership approach and associated programmes), a review of 
existing evaluations highlight both positive and negative aspects of initiatives.  The 
Springboard programme has been the subject of one of the more rigorous evaluations of 
the area-based programmes under examination here (McKeown, Haase and Pratschke, 
2001). This programme was designed to provide early intervention supports to families 
that were at risk of requiring child protection interventions. It was established in 1998 with 
15 pilot projects around the country and was still in pilot phase when the evaluation study 
was carried out. The evaluation found that the majority of families in the programme 
showed significant gains in a number of carefully measured indicators of well-being over a 
year-and-a-half participation period. While the study, for ethical reasons, did not include a 
non-intervention control group, the authors nevertheless concluded that the gains in well-
being among the majority of programme participants were marked, and were such as 
could not be achieved other than through a high level of effectiveness in the programme 
(McKeown, Haase and Pratschke, 2001).  
 
The present study supports the general conclusion from much research that the 
interventions which have the most positive impact are those which are preventive in focus 
(Murphy, 2010). Besides Springboard,  area-based programmes of this type include the 
Family and Community Services Resource Centres Programme, which aims to prevent 
family breakdown and particularly the entry of children into the care system (McKeown et 
al, 2001). The early reviews of the Local Drugs Task Forces were negative, but more 
recent analysis of their work in preventing and combating drug misuse and ongoing drug 
dependency is much more positive (PA Consulting Group, 1998, 2001; National Drugs 
Strategy Team, 2002; Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2006).  
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By contrast, many of the area-based programmes which were more broadly targeted have 
not been positively evaluated. For instance, the evaluation of RAPID by Fitzpatrick and 
Associates (2006) indicates that its early years were dominated by detailed local 
development planning, and the target communities were disappointed when the funding 
provided failed to match the expectations generated. Similarly an early evaluation of the 
Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme (EOCP) attributed disappointing progress in the 
provision of new childcare places to the lengthy planning required for programme set-up 
and the building of capacity among the community sector providers of these services 
(NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit, 2003). Research on the early years of the Urban Renewal 
Scheme found that it achieved strongly positive results in combating dereliction in target 
areas but few tangible socio-economic benefits for low-income local residents (KPMG, 
1996). Research on its impact since 2000 and on the Rural Renewal scheme has reached 
more negative findings. It indicates that take-up of these incentives was significant and, in 
the context of the property boom in this period, they were associated with significant 
deadweight (investment which would have occurred without the incentives) and generated 
an over-supply of housing (Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2005). The available 
evidence on social housing regeneration schemes such as the Remedial Works Scheme 
indicates that where the problems of target estates relate primarily to the built 
environment, these interventions have been successful. However, because they only 
provide capital funding, social landlords face significant difficulties in raising funding for 
regeneration programmes which aim to address social and economic decline (Treadwell 
Shine and Norris, 2006). 
 
2.5  Area-based initiatives in the seven estates study 
In the light of the background just outlined, the contribution of the present study to the 
analysis of ABIs derives from its local area-based focus. As mentioned earlier, the study 
did not seek to assess the impact of programmes, since the deficiencies in information 
required for such assessment that have been highlighted in many previous studies still 
exist and made it impossible to track impacts with any degree of reliability. Rather, it 
sought to document ABIs from a community viewpoint rather than from the perspective of 
discrete programmes; that is, to establish what such activities taken together amount to on 
the ground in specific disadvantaged neighbourhoods, principally in terms of the totality of 
expenditure, types of services or initiatives delivered and, to some extent, types of outputs 
achieved. The programme perspective that is normally adopted in this field, by contrast, 
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looks at initiatives and their significance primarily through a programme lens. This means 
that, typically, little or no attention is paid to the operation of parallel programmes in the 
same localities, resulting in an inability to  assess that which matters most from a 
community viewpoint, namely, the collective significance of all programmes taken together 
rather than the separate significance of each programme taken in isolation. This focus on 
ABIs collectively, viewed from the perspective of the communities that receive them rather 
than the programmes that provide them, represents one of the key contributions of this 
research on ABIs in the seven estates.   
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3 Strand 1: Social change in the seven estates 
 
3.1 National impact of the economic boom at small-area level 
In order to establish the national context in which social change in the study estates might 
be viewed, the present study drew on an analysis by Trutz Haase of census data for 2006 
on national patterns of social change at the small-area level, updating previous work which 
had examined trends for the period 1991-2002. This work was carried out as part of 
continuing development of the Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation, an instrument 
for measuring the spatial distribution of affluence and deprivation in Ireland that was first 
applied to the 1986 Census. The area-units on which this analysis is based consist of 
Electoral Divisions (EDs), the smallest spatial units for which census data are available 
throughout the country. The methodology for the index has been revised on a number of 
occasions to reflect international best practice and the Index has been recalculated for 
each census since 1986 (for an alternative approach to the measurement of spatial 
deprivation which focuses on individual indicators rather than a combined index, see 
Callan et al, 2007: 125-151). In particular, the number of indicators was increased and 
refined to take account of the distinctive nature of disadvantage in Ireland, and the 
statistical methodology underpinning the calculations was made more robust (Haase and 
Pratschke, 2005).  
 
At the national level for the period 1986 to 2006, analysis of this Index shows the following 
major findings: 
 The advent of economic boom from the mid-1990s had a positive effect in virtually all 
areas of the country. In absolute terms, poorer areas improved considerably, but 
because of widespread improvements in all areas their relative position remained 
generally unchanged. 
 Dublin Inner City was the only region where deprived areas showed relative as well as 
absolute improvement. This distinctive pattern in Dublin was caused by an influx of 
new, well-off residents into previously deprived areas, much of it prompted by the 
availability of new tax-incentivised apartment accommodation. These areas now 
contain a mix of better-off and poorer households and so have countered previous 
trends towards spatial segregation of the poor in Dublin.  
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 Parts of Limerick city showed distinctively lower levels of improvement than the 
national norm. 
 The greatest increases in affluence occurred between 1996 and 2002, though the 
general rise continued at a slower pace up to 2006. 
 Affluence grew in concentric rings around the main urban centres, effectively in the 
urban commuter belts. With the exception of Dublin inner city, cities in general did not 
improve as much as the rest of the country. 
 
3.2 Impact on the seven estates 
It is possible to extract from the database on the Index of Relative Affluence and 
Deprivation an approximate statistical picture of changing social conditions in the seven 
estates. This is done in the present section, while the next section provides the results of 
our direct observations on an estate-by-estate basis. A limitation of the statistical analysis 
in the present section is that, while for two of the seven estates (Fettercairn and Finglas 
South) the boundaries of the EDs on which the analysis is based coincide with those of the 
estates, for the other five there are varying degrees of mis-match between ED boundaries 
and estate boundaries. The lack of fit is particularly pronounced for the two estates in 
provincial towns (Cranmore in Sligo and Muirhevnamor in Dundalk). Here the EDs in which 
the estates are embedded are larger than the estates by a considerable margin and the 
data are of limited value in tracking trends in the estates. In the other five estates, 
however, despite some looseness of fit between ED and estate boundaries, the data 
provide a useful means of assessing the nature and direction of social change either in the 
estates themselves or the larger neighbourhoods in which they are embedded.  
 
A selection of indicators from this analysis is presented in Table 1, focusing on the period 
of concern to the present study – 1996-2006. The first indicator in the table is the absolute 
scores on the Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation for the two years. This Index is 
constructed from 14 separate indicators of social conditions in EDs, five of which relate to 
demographic profile, five to social class composition, and four to labour market situation. 
Scoring on the Index can be presented either in absolute terms, in which case the same 
scale is used for every year and scores can be directly compared across years, or in 
relative terms, in which case the scoring for each year is calculated relative to the average 
national score for that year. Only the absolute scores on the Index are reported in Table 1. 
These scores are constructed in such a way that the mean score for the whole country in 
1991 was set to zero and forms the baseline against which other years are measured, 
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while the standard deviation was set to 10. The outer limits of the Index are -50 and +50, 
with the majority of EDs falling within a considerably narrower range. The mean scores for 
Ireland shown in Table 1 for 1996 and 2006 are higher than zero, indicating an overall 
improvement nationally since the baseline of 1991. Table 1 also presents data on three of 
the individual indicators that are components of the Index – the percentage of the adult 
population with third-level education, the male unemployment rate and the percentage of 
families headed by lone parents. These are included to illustrate the kinds of items the 
overall Index takes account of. (Note that the data on unemployment used here are based 
on census measurement which provides a less precise and usually higher estimate of 
unemployment than is derived from the standard official source used for this purpose, the 
Quarterly National Household Survey. The less precise census measure is used here 
because QNHS data are not available at small-area level and so cannot be applied to the 
study estates.)  
 
The absolute Index scores for the seven estates or their larger neighbourhoods shown in 
Table 1 reveal an improvement in social conditions in all cases. In Ushers C+D, in which 
Fatima Mansions is located, and in Fettercairn, the improvement was large and was over 
three times greater than the improvement at national level. Deanrock had the smallest 
improvement but it was operating from a higher base than the other estates – it both 
started and ended the period with the strongest Index scores. Ballynanty-Moyross was at a 
similar level to Fatima Mansions and Fettercairn in 1996 and it improved somewhat by 
2006, but the improvement was small in relative terms and left this area with a markedly 
weaker score in 2006 than the other estates, a gap which did not exist in 1996.   
 
Table 1 Selected Indicators of Social Change in Electoral Districts in which the seven study estates are located, 1996-2006 
Absolute Index* Scores Third level education Male unemployment rate Lone parent rate EDs in which estates are 
located 
1996 2006
Change 
1996-2006 1996 % 2006% Change 1996-2006
1996 
% 
2006
% 
Change 
1996-2006
1996 
% 
2006
% 
Change 
1996-
2006 
Ushers C+D 
   Fatima Mansions 
-21.6 -2.5 19.1 10.9 28.3 17.3 45.1 19.4 -25.7 51.2 58.4 7.2 
Finglas South B+C 
   South Finglas 
-16.8 -9.6 7.2 3.5 10.7 7.2 34.4 18.6 -15.8 23.5 51.6 28.1 
Tallaght – Fettercairn -21.3 -3.7 17.6 3.8 10.5 6.8 52.1 22.8 -29.3 36.8 53.3 16.5 
Togher A 
   Deanrock 
-6.2 -4.9 1.3 9.5 11.6 2.1 28.0 16.7 -11.3 23.8 42.4 18.6 
Ballynanty- 
   Moyross 
-17.9 -14.3 3.6 4.9 6.0 1.2 40.9 28.8 -12.1 37.8 63.9 26.1 
Dundalk Rural 
   Muirhevnamor 
-4.0 2.2 6.2 16.3 23.0 6.7 23.0 16.6 -6.4 18.0 37.9 19.9 
Sligo East 
   Cranmore 
0.4 4.5 4.1 19.1 25.7 6.6 25.3 15.3 -10 23.2 35.9 12.7 
Ireland 5.2 10.4 5.2 19.7 30.5 10.8 16.4 8.8 -7.6 13.8 21.3 7.5 
Note:  *Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation (Haase and Pratschke, 2005) 
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Similar patterns hold with the next two indicators in the table, the percentage with third level 
education, which rose in all estates, and the male unemployment rate, which fell in all estates, 
in some instances quite sharply. In Fettercairn, for example, the percentage with third level 
education rose from 3.8 per cent in 1996 to 10.5 per cent in 2006, while the fall in the male 
unemployment rate – from 52.1 per cent to 22.8 per cent – was quite dramatic. While all the 
estates showed an increase in the percentage with third level education, the absolute extent 
of the increase was less than the national increase in all cases except Fatima Mansions. In 
the latter instance, those with third level education increased by 17 percentage points 
compared to a national increase of 10.8 percentage points. 
 
The fall in male unemployment in the study estates was generally greater than the 
corresponding national fall. Even in Ballynanty-Moyross, where improvement in social 
indicators was generally weaker than in the other areas, the decline in the male 
unemployment rate was 12.1 percentage points compared to a national decline of 7.6 
percentage points. This reflected the general national pattern that the greatest relative 
improvement in unemployment occurred in previous unemployment blackspots. Yet it is also 
notable that despite the large declines which occurred in male unemployment in the study 
estates, all of them ended up in 2006 with male unemployment rates that were considerably 
higher than the national norm. This is in keeping with the previously noted national pattern 
that despite large absolute improvement in many social indicators in deprived areas, their 
relative position on those indicators in national rankings remained more or less unchanged. 
 
The third indicator, the percentage of families headed by a lone parent, reveals a different 
direction of development as it shows that all the study estates increased their rate of lone 
parenthood, sometimes to quite high levels. In Fettercairn, for example, the percentage of 
households headed by a lone parent increased from 36.8 per cent in 1996 to 53.3 per cent in 
2006. This suggests that while many aspects of social change in the period 1996-2006 helped 
improve social conditions in the estates, there were counter-trends such as increased family 
disruption that tended to increase the social and economic vulnerability of families in these 
areas. 
41 
 
3.3 Variations between and within estates   
Alongside the shared direction of social change shown for most of the estates in Table 1, 
there are also evident differences between them, as revealed both by the quantitative data 
and by our observations and interviews on the ground. We now briefly outline the patterns of 
similarities and difference between the estates, taking account also that the estates were not 
internally uniform but that it is difficult to capture in a precise way the detailed variations in 
social conditions between different parts of individual estates. 
 
Cranmore 
Cranmore had a population in 2006 of approximately 1,500-2,000 people, living in 511 
standard single-family houses. Our 1997-98 research revealed that the estate had a poor 
public image in the Sligo area but internally was quite diverse: some parts of the estate 
(particularly one area, Bank’s Drive) were dilapidated and were in low demand but others had 
an attractive, settled appearance. The estate also had the advantages of being well located 
close the centre of the town and a strong tradition of community involvement and pride.  
 
The present study found that the estate had stabilised in some ways by the mid-2000s but still 
had significant social problems and continued to have a poor image in the Sligo area. The 
Bank’s Drive of the estate was taken over and refurbished by Clúid housing association in 
1998 and was given a new name. By 2008 house prices had increased greatly within the 
estate, with houses fetching €120,000-€160,000 in that year compared to €28,000-€32,000 in 
1997. However, prices were still significantly below the national and regional average. The ED 
in which Cranmore is located (total population 5,334 in 2006) was characterised by high 
levels of unemployment (25.3 per cent) and single parent households (35.9 per cent) in 2006 
(see: Table 1). According to the managers of community and public services interviewed for 
this study, the estate still presented issues of early school leaving, high unemployment, high 
welfare dependence, and antisocial behaviour.  
 
A regeneration of the estate beyond Bank’s Drive began in 2004. The social aspect of 
regeneration focused on building community capacity through the establishment of the 
Cranmore Community Co-op and developing interagency engagement between community, 
voluntary and statutory organisations. During the past decade a large number of community 
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services have been established in the estate, many of which are concerned with family 
support and youth work. The physical aspect of regeneration commenced with the 
refurbishment of some dwellings, the de-tenanting of others, landscaping and the provision of 
a playground. However, progress on regeneration stalled as it became caught up in issues 
about roadway developments around the eastern edge of Sligo town which would have cut 
into Cranmore estate. By 2010 funds allocated by the Department of the Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government for the regeneration of Cranmore were not released because 
of differences between the Department and Sligo Urban Council on the roads issue. As a 
result, work on the capital aspect of the programme came to virtual halt and the estate is now 
disfigured by boarded-up housing that was scheduled for demolition or refurbishment but is 
not now being worked on. Ambitious regeneration programmes, once embarked on, can be 
disruptive to an estate, and the Cranmore experience illustrates how the drawbacks can 
intensify if the unforeseen events cause the programme to stall part-way through and is left in 
a partly-completed state.  
 
Deanrock 
In the original study in 1997-98, Deanrock emerged as the most successful of the seven 
estates. It was in high demand among tenants, despite suffering the disadvantage that the 
original build quality of the dwellings in the estate was poor. The present study indicates that 
Deanrock’s position of relative advantage compared to the other estates has continued, and 
indeed has been enhanced by the recent demolition of blocks of flats of poor build quality that 
had been the most problematic dwellings in the estate in the past (though, as the previous 
study found, even these dwellings had been in considerable demand among tenants because 
of the generally good reputation of Deanrock as a neighbourhood). As a local authority 
housing manager stated: 
The one thing about Deanrock, and it has to be noted as the one outstanding 
thing which has helped, is the knocking of the flats… the majority (but not all) of 
the problems being experienced by the residents of Deanrock Estate were 
associated around the flats…  
 
The popularity of Deanrock among residents and its good image in the wider community were 
highlighted by the increasing number of houses bought by tenants in the estate, and the 
relatively high prices commanded by dwellings that had previously been purchased by 
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tenants and were now trading in the open market. At the height of the property boom in 2006-
07, estate agents in the locality reported selling prices for houses in Deanrock in excess of 
€300,000, a remarkable fact given the modest physical qualities of the dwellings. Local 
observers claimed that while housing in Deanrock experienced a certain price penalty 
because of its local authority associations, that penalty was modest, at no more than 10 per 
cent or so. This again emphasises the degree to which Deanrock, like many other local 
authority estates in urban areas in Ireland, had merged into the general fabric of urban life 
and avoided the negative connotations that are often assumed to be attached to social 
housing. 
 
It is notable also from Table 1 above that this positive outcome for Deanrock and its 
surrounding area in Togher was not conditional on a distinctive population profile compared to 
the other estates. While it was better than some of those estates on some counts it was by no 
means consistently the best: it did not have an unusually high percentage of the population 
with third level education, a distinctively low male unemployment rate or a distinctively low 
proportion of families headed by lone parents. This is to reinforce the point made in the 
original study a decade ago: one cannot read off the success or attractiveness of a social 
housing estate from its scores on the usual indicators such as the educational levels, 
employment rates or family circumstances of its residents. Rather, additional factors intervene 
to enhance or reduce the resilience of the local community in the face of forms of adversity 
that are common throughout the sector. It is these factors, which centre on the presence or 
absence of small numbers of extremely disadvantaged households in the estates and the 
consequent presence or absence of social order problems that strongly affect the quality of 
neighbourhood life and dictate the difference between success and failure of estates. 
 
Fatima Mansions 
Fatima Mansions was one of the more troubled estates in the 1997-8 study and was viewed 
by residents as having reached a crisis point due to poor quality dwellings, hard drug misuse 
and general anti-social behaviour. Since then it has been completely transformed by a top-to-
bottom regeneration programme which commenced in 2004 and, in physical terms, was 
completed in 2009. As the plan envisaged, the existing blocks of flats in the estate were 
demolished and replaced with a mix of new, high-quality social and private housing and new 
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community facilities, financed and delivered on the basis of a public-private partnership. The 
regeneration process drew on extensive consultation with residents. Their representative 
body (Fatima Groups United) was centrally involved in its design and took part in the 
implementation of the social regeneration plan. It coordinated efforts to change the poor 
public image of the estate by encouraging positive media reporting and organising public 
events. 
 
The improvements in the social profile of Fatima Mansions outlined in Table 1 are reflected in 
the positive views of residents. In interviews for the present study, one resident mentioned 
that ‘things are better, people have been lifted, there is pride in the idea that “We’re from 
Fatima’’’. Another reported that ‘[Regeneration] makes a difference to our appreciation of 
ourselves, it lifts our spirits and lightens our hearts’, while another was enthused that 
continuity of the community had been maintained in the midst of change:  
 
It’s great, you still think you are in the flats only for you live in a house, you know 
what I mean because you see everybody that you were born and reared with, 
your neighbours and all. So it stills seems like Fatima only that you are in your 
own little comfortable home with your central heating and your back garden. 
 
Although the physical transformation of the estate is the most visible manifestation of 
regeneration, certain key social changes were also fundamental to its success. Action by the 
Gardaí and Dublin City Council to address anti-social behaviour, as part of a wider reform of 
housing management, was especially influential, and some community activists point in 
particular to a small number of evictions of problem tenants as key turning points. In addition, 
strong community services were developed in the areas of drug treatment, family support, 
childcare and education, which were funded by the various government area-based 
programmes and also via the PPP. The quality of such services was particularly high in this 
case and many were innovatively designed. This reflects particularly impressive capacity 
among community activists in this estate and their related success in securing funding for 
these services. 
 
While Fatima Mansions can be counted as a successful regeneration in its own terms, several 
features limit its wider relevance or raise questions about its long-term future. The first is that 
the estate is small and its social housing component became considerably smaller as a 
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consequence of the regeneration. Ten years ago there were 320 social housing units in the 
estate. By 2009 there were 150, alongside a projected total of 70 affordable dwellings and 
396 private apartments. The very smallness of the present social housing community in the 
estate gives it a manageability and community character that is unlike that found in the other 
estates in our study, all of which are now considerably larger than Fatima Mansions. In fact, it 
is difficult to isolate the effects of the reduction in social housing in the estate and compare its 
significance with other possible influences on the outcome of regeneration, but it is unlikely 
that similar reductions will take place in estate regeneration plans in the future. The second 
distinctive feature of the Fatima Mansions scheme was the interlinkage between the 
regeneration plan and the property boom of the period. The terms of the public-private 
partnership that financed and carried through the physical regeneration and that provided 
cash resources to fund social aspects of the plan were predicated on inflated land values, 
high demand for private housing and easy credit for development purposes. These all 
disappeared with the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008-09. Thus, Fatima Mansions 
scheme is likely to have been a one-off which has little prospect of being replicated 
elsewhere, and even at that has not fully evolved into the mix of public and private housing 
that was originally envisaged (Norris and Redmond, 2009).  
 
A third question mark arising over the Fatima Mansions case is one that arises in all instances 
of highly localised urban regeneration schemes, particularly those that are successful in their 
own areas. This is the degree to which, rather than solve social problems in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods these schemes simply displace them to other neighbourhoods which then 
become the new bottom rung on the ladder (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2005). In the case of 
Fatima Mansions, the key question is whether the new population of social housing tenants is 
not only smaller than that which preceded the regeneration but also is socially more selective. 
Analysis of the broad social profile of the post-regeneration tenant population suggests that 
extreme forms of selection have not occurred – those tenants are just as disadvantaged in 
broad terms as were those that lived in the estate in the pre-regeneration period (Whyte, 
2005). However, broad social indicators do not pick out the small numbers of extremely 
disadvantaged and highly disruptive residents whose presence or absence can have a 
disproportionate impact on the quality of community life in neighbourhoods. Activists in Fatima 
Mansions accept that regeneration in the estate did entail a certain element of exclusion of 
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such households, achieved in part through a small number of what they regard as crucial 
evictions. Some ‘difficult’ households continued to live in the estate after regeneration and are 
successfully coped with in the context of the better general environment and improved social 
services now present in the estate. Yet, there is a view among activists that despite the much 
improved resources at their disposal in the post-regeneration set-up, they could not have 
coped with the number and range of problem households found in the estate prior to 
regeneration and so depended on a certain measure of displacement for the regeneration to 
work. It is likely also in the long run that competition for social housing in the estate and the 
high level of community capacity it now possesses will have the effect of restricting access to 
the estate for disruptive households. These factors together mean, therefore, that 
displacement has played a certain part in the success of Fatima Mansions. While that 
success is real and is not to be taken for granted, it is qualified by the consequences of 
displacement for other less fortunate neighbourhoods in that part of the city.  
 
The final feature of Fatima Mansions that must be noted is the uncertainty that now exists 
about the future of the private apartments and thus about the eventual trajectory of the entire 
estate. Private apartment buildings account for some two-thirds of the current stock of 
dwellings. They were completed and came on-stream as the Dublin property market crashed, 
with the result that the expected buyer demand never materialised. The majority of the 
apartments are now vacant. This outcome has meant, in the first instance, that the 
‘community dividend’ that, as part of the original PPP plan, was expected to derive from the 
profits of the private component of the PPP development – that is, payments of the order of 
€5.6 million from the developer to the local community – have largely failed to materialise and 
are unlikely now to emerge as originally envisaged. There is also the question of what is to 
become of the vacant apartment blocks in question.  
 
Fettercairn 
The Fettercairn estate is located in West Tallaght and was built in the early 1980s. It originally 
consisted of 692 two-storey, standard houses, but this has since expanded due to the 
construction of infill housing. The study of ten years ago found that the tenancies in the estate 
were in moderate demand, with a very low number of long-term voids. However, the 
environment was dilapidated, unemployment was high, and the estate was isolated from 
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commercial services. Drug use, drug dealing and anti-social behaviour, in particular joy riding 
and vandalism, were central concerns for residents. The local authority responsible for the 
estate – South Dublin County Council – had been created only in 1996, arising from the 
breaking up of the former Dublin County Council into three separate authorities. Residents 
carried over an attitude of suspicion and hostility towards the local authority as a legacy of 
their previous experiences.  
 
By 2009 Fettercairn stood out as an estate that had matured and settled in the absence of 
any major regeneration or capital investment programme, although it had benefited from 
funding of community facilities under the Urban programme . The indicators set out in Table 1 
confirm the progress that had taken place. In 1996 the estate appeared as vulnerable as 
Moyross or Finglas South but by 2006 it had developed in a more positive direction. By then, 
turnover of residents in the estates was low, demand for new tenancies was high, levels of 
tenant purchase had risen and house resale prices had converged with the norm in the wider 
Tallaght area. 
 
This outcome arose in part because of development of the wider Tallaght area, in particular 
from the new commercial services in the Square shopping centre and Tallaght Village, and 
the provision of the Luas light railway. Since South Dublin County Council took over as 
landlord, it has reformed housing management arrangements and relations with residents 
have improved. Some physical improvements have been undertaken in the estate – rotten 
windows have been replaced, central heating installed and new infill housing and walls 
strategically constructed in order to close off alleyways and increase the surveillance of green 
areas which were previously sites for anti-social behaviour. Although the scale of these 
developments was small, they have succeeded in addressing the relatively modest problems 
with the quality of the built environment found in the estate. Public and community services 
have expanded significantly in the estate over the past decade and are distinguished by a 
remarkable degree of inter-agency work, exchange of information and cooperation. South 
Dublin County Council in particular has played an important role, both in innovating and 
improving on its own services and in working with and coordinating the services of other 
agencies. Local Gardaí interviewed noted a dramatic reduction in drug dealing and joyriding – 
evidenced by the reduced number of burnt-out cars in the estate – although problems of 
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vandalism persist. Improved community policing has played a key role in this development 
and in fostering better relations between the Gardaí and residents, as has better estate 
management and management of anti-social behaviour by South Dublin County Council. 
 
The generally positive story that emerges from Fettercairn is significant as it indicates how an 
area that was vulnerable for much of its early existence can settle down and grow out of its 
vulnerabilities – a process that historically has been much more common in local authority 
housing than is often recognised. In addition, it represents a distinctive pattern of policy 
intervention that has proved highly effective. This is a pattern of a large number of small 
actions that were not conceived of as part of a major, high-spend regeneration programme 
but were nevertheless innovative and responsive to local conditions. These actions acquired 
added value by virtue of the creative, coordinating role of the local authority, and indeed could 
be said to demonstrate how good local government should operate in disadvantaged areas 
and what an energetic local authority can achieve. 
  
Finglas South 
Finglas South spans a large area, comprising seven clusters of estates and covering most of 
the EDs of Finglas South B and C and all of Finglas South D. Our 1997-98 research reported 
high levels of anti-social behaviour in the estate, similar in many respects to Fettercairn. 
However, the maturation and settling down which has been evident in Fettercairn over the 
past decade is less to be seen in Finglas South. As the data in Table 1 above suggest, 
general social indicators have improved in the area. However, social order problems remain, 
new levels of serious violence have emerged in the form of inter-gang killings, and tensions 
between local young people and the Gardaí have persisted. These outcomes mean that 
Finglas South has diverged from Fettercairn to some degree over the past decade and now is 
a less settled neighbourhood than Fettercairn has become. 
 
In 1998 Dublin City Council established a project team tasked with identifying and eliminating 
the urban design features which have contributed to anti-social behaviour. In 1999 this team 
produced a report which identified a number of key community concerns regarding anti-social 
behaviour, drug dealing and using, the poor quality of the built environment, lack of housing 
options for locals other than social housing, and poor relations with the City Council. 
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The resulting regeneration scheme focused on removing problematic public spaces, closing 
entrances/exits to the estates with infill social, affordable and private housing, narrowing 
roads to reduce opportunities for joy riding and to provide car parking for residents, and the 
provision of community facilities, including a new Civic Centre which accommodated a local 
housing management office, a youth centre and childcare centre. This was funded by an 
innovative mix of sources, including direct public grant aid, a ‘financial contribution’ from older 
people who sold their houses and were provided with tenancies in Dublin City Council’s 
sheltered housing for older people, the proceeds of sales of affordable housing built on 
Council-owned land, and a Public Private Partnership scheme which facilitated the 
construction of social and affordable housing and a hotel on Council-owned land. The head of 
the local area partnership company suggested that Dublin City Council ‘played an absolute 
blinder the way they tapped into and used resources and made things happen’. 
 
A Dublin City Council housing manager who was interviewed in 2008-09 suggested that 
these developments have:  
 
 had a significant impact in terms of the relationship building that we talked 
about, in terms of people getting used to the face, you’re known in the locality or 
whatever, you can go out and about and you build up the necessary 
relationships, not just with the residents but even with the guards and that type 
of partnership. 
However, interviews with residents indicate that, from their perspective, relations remain poor. 
Many of their concerns related to the extent of anti-social behaviour on the estate and to how 
this issue is handled by the Council and the Gardaí.  
 
Despite the appointment of local area officers responsible for addressing low level anti-social 
behaviour such as graffiti, litter and illegal dumping, our visits to Finglas South revealed 
extensive problems of this type on these estates, together with a large number of boarded-up 
houses, which contributed to an air of dereliction. Council staff explained the large number of 
vacant dwellings with reference to cuts in the maintenance budget and the refusal of offers of 
housing by applicants who wished to remain in rent supplement supported, private rented 
accommodation. Residents felt that serious anti-social behaviour has increased in the estate, 
50 
 
and killings arising from inter-gang feuding have occurred to a degree that was absent ten 
years ago. For instance one resident reported: 
… people are afraid to leave their houses in the night time. People just swerve 
up and down, going down with their cars [joyriding]… there’d be houses, certain 
roads … they’re just no go areas in the night time…. The other thing that 
intimidates people as well, and that’s one of the big differences as you said from 
ten years ago, is gangs hanging around 24/7 when it used to be a weekend 
thing, but it’s all day, every day. 
A community worker highlighted the difficulties which the prevalence of anti-social behaviour 
created for his work: 
you would know from the amount of ‘tit for tat’ murders that have taken place in 
the area over the last while, there is certainly a serious problem of gangland 
activity in certain areas that undermines a lot of the work that’s been done. And 
it probably also undermines in no small way the willingness of people to 
maintain their contact with residents associations or to be community 
representatives or to put themselves out there in the community because they 
can end up being targeted and they’re afraid. 
 
Residents complained that Dublin City Council has proved slow in tackling these problems, 
and levels of evictions are low, partly because many of the perpetrators are living as owners 
in tenant-purchased accommodation over which the Council no longer has control. Relations 
between the residents of Finglas South and the Garda Síochána were also extremely strained 
in the estate. Interviewees expressed the view that the Gardaí were ‘out of their depth in the 
area’ and highlighted the lack of co-ordination between the community Gardaí, the Drugs 
Squad and the Garda Emergency Response Unit. A Community Safety Forum has recently 
been established in the area in an attempt to address the latter issue. 
 
Moyross   
If Deanrock was the outstanding case of an estate that had continued in a positive trajectory 
that was already present in 1997-98, Moyross was at the opposite extreme. The original study 
had highlighted it as an estate that seemed to be recovering from a previous long history of 
decline. The housing department in Limerick City Council had emerged at that time as one of 
the most progressive and effective in responding to the problems of its social housing estates, 
including Moyross. The estate had an established framework of strong and effective 
community organisations, partly under the influence of the Paul Partnership, which was 
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founded in Limerick City in 1990 under the EU’s Poverty 3 programme (Walsh et al, 
1998:121-162). Problems of social order were undoubtedly present in the estate but the 
council, the residents and the community organisations had together seemed to be 
responding well to those problems since the mid-1990s. The council seemed to have been 
particularly successful in bringing back to life a section of the estate (the Glenagross area) 
that had been blighted by anti-social behaviour and was being abandoned by tenants in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The council’s achievement in this area by the second half of the 
1990s was highlighted in our previous study as an example of effective regeneration of social 
housing (Norris, 1999:119-20)  
 
At around the turn of the present decade, however, conditions in Moyross took a serious turn 
for the worse as it was affected by a wave of criminality and violence arising from inter-gang 
feuding. A key precipitating event was the murder in Limerick city centre of a prominent local 
gang member in November 2000, which is said to have been the result of a falling-out 
between the victim and a lifelong associate. Subsequent tit-for-tat violence between feuding 
family-based gangs resulted in up to ten murders in Limerick over the following eight years 
(Irish Examiner, 8 April 2008). Other acts of violence in Limerick also grabbed national 
attention, especially a fire-bomb attack on a car in September 2006 in which two children 
were badly burned. Many of these incidents (including the fire-bombing of the car) occurred in 
Moyross or involved people from Moyross, but other estates in the city were also affected. 
This gave rise to a perception that the poorer parts of the city were afflicted by out-of-control, 
gun-wielding criminals to a degree never before seen in any city in Ireland. Demand for 
housing in Moyross (as in certain other estates) fell off, and there was virtually no market for 
the housing that previously had been bought out by tenants. For instance, prices for housing 
in the few sales that did occur were reported by local estate agents to be in the region of 
€50,000- €60,000 in the best parts of Moyross, which were only about a fifth of prices for 
similar housing in Deanrock. 
 
In reaction to a growing public sense that Limerick was in a state of crisis, the government 
commissioned a special report on the city in November 2006 (the Fitzgerald Report) which 
focused on social conditions in Moyross and the other local authority estates in the city most 
associated with violent crime. This report painted a bleak picture of neglect, decline and 
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disorder in these estates and the incapacity of existing structures and services to deal with 
the scale of problems experienced. On the recommendation of this report, the government set 
up the Limerick Regeneration Agencies in 2007 (a northside and a southside Regeneration 
Agency) to take charge of bringing the worst-affected local authority estates in Limerick back 
to acceptable standards. As we have already noted, the data in Table 1 above show that 
some improvement in the social profile of Moyross occurred between 1996 and 2006 but the 
scale of improvement was slight compared both to the national average and to the other 
estates in our study. As a result, Moyross was clearly the most disadvantaged of the seven 
estates in 2006, a distinction it did not have ten years previously. Community activists 
interviewed for this study believed that criminality and associated intimidation were the key 
cause of the estate’s recent decline rather than disadvantage per se. Residents had also 
become more critical of the housing management service provided by Limerick City Council, 
particularly because of what they saw as its failure to take action against crime and anti-social 
behaviour. The Gardaí were criticised on the same grounds. Despite this a large number of 
innovative community services have been established on the estate during the last decade, 
and the problems in Moyross seemed to have arisen in spite of a reasonably high level of 
community activism in the estate rather than because such activism was absent.  
 
Muirhevnamor 
Muirhevnamor is an estate in Dundalk that is large by provincial town standards. As is the 
case with Cranmore, its local image is not especially good but it does not have the severity of 
problems found in the worst-off of the large city estates such as Moyross or Finglas South. In 
the original study ten years ago, it stood out for its high level of community activism, 
exemplified by the community’s success in developing a Gaelscoil, the only one in Dundalk at 
the time (Ó Cinnéide, 1999:217), but it also had a certain level of anti-social behaviour.    
The intermediate position of Muirhevnamor in the ranking of the seven estates in the original 
study still holds. General improvement is evident in the estate, and certain important services 
have developed. One of these is the local Springboard project, which is notable not only as a 
local instance of a service designed to support small numbers of highly vulnerable families 
that nationally has been found to be effective, but also because it is located in the grounds of 
the local primary school and thus achieves a degree of integration with the school system 
which is lacking in similar services in other estates. The continuing vitality of local community 
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life is instanced by the community’s success in developing an impressive boxing club which 
was completed in 2004 on the basis of funding received from a range of sources. In response 
to social order problems, Louth County Council and Dundalk Town Council had jointly 
appointed an anti-social behaviour officer with a remit to cover the north of County Louth. The 
brief for this role was to intervene early and in a non-aggressive way in cases where local 
conflicts and complaints concerning anti-social behaviour had emerged. While the 
effectiveness of this method of intervention has yet to be established, it is at least significant 
as an indication of willingness and intent. 
 
Because of the large and relatively deprived status of Muirhevnamor in the social housing 
system of the north-east, it has become the focus of extensive planning for regeneration. 
However, slow progress on this planning has become a source of tension between residents 
and Dundalk Town Council. A large part of this difficulty turns on conflicting views on what 
regeneration should entail. The Town Council, acting under direction from the Department of 
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, has expanded the area to be included in 
regeneration plans to incorporate a wider locality in which the estate is located, while resident 
representatives strive to focus more narrowly on the distinctive and serious problems in the 
estate itself. Furthermore, initial plans for the estate itself produced by the Town Council, 
which followed extensive consultation with residents, contained proposals for demolition of 
some housing that residents claim lay outside of anything they had discussed or proposed. In 
general, the experience of regeneration planning in Muirhevnamor has shown how it can 
increase tensions between residents and the local authority, despite extensive efforts to base 
it on local consultation. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Both the quantitative and qualitative data for the seven estates indicate that they experienced 
a general improvement in social conditions over the years of the economic boom. In one case 
– Moyross – improvement on some social indicators was counterbalanced by a sharp worsen-
ing in social order conditions, largely associated with an upsurge since 2000 in drug use and 
crime in the city, particularly drug-related crime, and reflected in tit-for-tat killings among 
criminal gangs. For various reasons, this particularly affected the large local authority estates 
in the city, including Moyross. In the other estates in our study, however, the picture was 
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generally more positive. Some estates fared particularly well – Deanrock, in keeping with its 
already existing upward trajectory, Fatima Mansions because of the massive regeneration 
programme which was carried through in that estate, and Fettercairn because of a mix of 
normal maturation, a considerable history of community development effort, good 
management approach by the local authority and the spill-over effects of development in the 
local region (such as the growth of Tallaght Town Centre and the construction of the Luas 
public transport system). The remaining estates fared less well, though the outcomes were 
still clearly positive on balance. Yet despite widespread improvement, problems of 
stigmatisation and marginalisation of parts of the estates and of sub-sections of the 
community remain. There is evidence that internal estate stratification is still salient. 
Respondents noted the continuing problem with motivating and integrating young men, many 
of whom are early school leavers. The presence of poorly functioning families on some 
estates remains a challenging problem. Interventions to improve the situation of these two 
groups are highly labour-intensive, and often precariously funded so that there is no sense of 
continuity of provision.  
 
There is considerable evidence of sustained engagement by residents in attempts to improve 
the quality of life on some estates. This is evident, for example, in resident involvement in 
regeneration programmes and voluntary provision of local sports. But in other cases, 
residents are more inclined to be passive rather than active, and to display a considerable 
degree of alienation from their neighbours and key service providers. How to engage these 
social housing residents remains a challenge. 
 
Residents’ capacity to act in their own interests has improved over the years. The emergence 
of positive role models across the estates, the higher completion rates in education and the 
employment uptake during the boom years all give cause for celebration within these 
communities. However, service providers across a number of estates expressed concern 
about the limits of the developments and the persistence of various forms of dependency. 
These limits have serious ramifications for welfare provision, particularly now that the state 
faces a severe fiscal crisis. The pathologising of the estates in the media continues, though in 
some instances the communities have been relatively successful in challenging the ways in 
which they and their estates are represented.  
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4 Strand 2: Area-based interventions  
 
4.1 National picture  
As mentioned above, no standard definition of the concept of area-based programmes is 
available and there is no tradition in anti-poverty policy of treating area-based interventions as 
a type of policy instrument that shares common objectives or methods. This lack of a 
standardised view of these interventions is itself significant, as it reflects the ad hoc, 
piecemeal manner in which they have grown up over the past two decades and the absence 
of a strategic approach to their role. For the purposes of the present project, they were taken 
to consist of publicly funded programmes that were intended to combat disadvantage and 
targeted on areas because they were identified as disadvantaged. As mentioned earlier, 
programmes of this type can seek to combat disadvantage either directly by targeting 
services or benefits on the poor who live in poor neighbourhoods or indirectly by encouraging 
better-off residents or businesses to move into those neighbourhoods, thus improving their 
socio-economic profile. Since most mainstream social services are not area-targeted in this 
way, area-based programmes, for the most part, can be thought of as ‘add-ons’ to the 
mainstream system. In addition, however, there is also a category of area-based programmes 
which seek to ‘bend’ the delivery of mainstream services so that they give special attention to 
poor areas (as identified above). The latter overlap with the mainstream system and do not 
have quite the same ‘add-on’ character as the majority of the area-based programmes that 
emerged in recent decades. Nevertheless, they are counted here as coming within the scope 
of area-based programmes.  
 
The loose definition just set out did not yield a precise means of drawing boundaries that 
would clearly mark off a set of programmes as ‘area-based’, largely because programmes 
varied in the emphasis they place on spatial targeting. Some defined it as fundamental and 
clearly specified the areas they aimed to reach (as in the RAPID programme which identifies 
as its target specific Electoral Districts that have been measured as falling below a specified 
deprivation threshold). Other programmes did not accord a central role to spatial targeting but 
merely indicated with varying degrees of emphasis that some priority in allocation of 
resources would be accorded to deprived areas. In addition, even though some programmes 
gave a strong role to spatial targeting in their design, when it came to implementation the 
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targeting criteria were in some cases relaxed so much that delivery of the programmes 
actually became quite diffuse and embraced large areas of the country. The present study 
drew a distinction between programmes that, nominally, were strongly targeted in spatial 
terms and those that were weakly targeted. It must be acknowledged that in some cases this 
distinction has limited significance in practice since nominal attention to spatial targeting in 
some programmes turned out to have limited real significance at implementation stage.  
 
Based on the approach just outlined, Table 2 presents a list of the national area-based social 
inclusion programmes that were in operation between 1996 and 2006, classifies them as 
‘strong’ or ‘weak’ in spatial targeting terms, and identifies the key implementation strategies 
they employed. A total of 23 such programmes were in operation in 2006, of which nine had 
been in place in 1996 and 14 had come into existence since then. Just under half of the 
programmes are classified as strongly targeted in spatial terms (in the nominal sense 
described earlier) and the majority were grant schemes which funded the provision of 
services by other agencies, usually in the voluntary or non-profit sector. Most of the 
programmes, such as Springboard, family and community resource centres, the National 
Childcare Investment Programme and the Young People’s Facilities and Services Fund, were 
single purpose measures which fund only one type of intervention. The Partnerships, CLÁR 
and RAPID provided grant aid for a variety of initiatives and also engaged in local 
development planning. CLÁR and RAPID, together with DEIS and the Remedial Works 
Scheme, can be thought of partly as special schemes for disadvantaged areas but are also, in 
a sense, extensions of the normal mainstream social services system in that  part of their 
function was to intensify the provision of mainstream public services in poor neighbourhoods. 
The Urban, Rural and Village and Town Renewal Schemes do not consist of direct 
expenditure but provided tax breaks for private sector investment in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. 
 
4.2 National expenditure 
In seeking to quantify national expenditure on the area-based programmes identified in Table 
2, it proved possible to deal only with expenditure from central government. A range of sub-
national bodies, such as the local authorities, the Vocational Education Committees 
 
Table 2  Remit, Implementation and Spatial Targeting of Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures, 1990-2006 
Intervention Dates Remit / objectives Implementation Strategies 
Implementation 
Agencies 
Spatial 
Targeting  
CLÁR (Ceantair Laga Árd-
Riachtanais) 
2001- 
ongoing 
Concentrate public expenditure on the most 
disadvantaged rural areas 
Planning, grant 
aid 
Local 
government, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
Community Development 
Programme 
1990- 
ongoing 
Develop a network of community 
development resource centres Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak 
Community Employment and 
Jobs Initiative 
1994- 
ongoing 
Employment experience and training for the 
long-term unemployed 
Grant aid, 
social security 
benefits 
Public sector, 
voluntary sector Weak 
Community Services Programme 
(called the Social Economy 
Programme until 2006) 
2000- 
ongoing 
Support social enterprises to deliver local 
services and employment opportunities for 
the disadvantaged 
Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak 
Delivering Equality of Opportunity 
in Schools (DEIS) – eight 
separate measures until 2005 
1984- 
ongoing 
Overcome educational disadvantage by 
additional investment in schools with a 
disadvantaged student body 
Planning, grant 
aid Schools Strong 
Dormant Accounts Fund 2001- ongoing 
Disburse unclaimed funds from credit and 
insurance institutions to alleviate poverty Grant aid 
Local 
government, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
EOCP (Equal Opportunities 
Childcare Programme) 2000-2007 
Provide childcare to enable parents to 
return to education or employment 
Planning, grant 
aid 
Private sector, 
voluntary sector Weak 
Family and Community Services 
Resource Centre Programme 
1994- 
ongoing 
Combat disadvantage and improve the 
function of the family unit Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak 
Local Government Social 
Inclusion Units 
2001- 
ongoing 
Enable local government to tackle social 
exclusion  
Service 
provision, grant 
aid 
Local 
government Weak 
Local Drugs Task Forces 1997- ongoing 
Facilitate community based response to 
drug problems 
Planning, grant 
aid Voluntary sector Strong 
Local Employment Service (LES) 1995- ongoing 
Promote employment re-integration of the 
long term unemployed  
Service 
provision, grant 
aid 
LES directly, 
voluntary sector Strong 
Local Partnership Companies 1991- ongoing 
Support local economic and employment 
and community development projects 
Planning, 
service 
provision, grant 
aid 
Partnerships 
directly, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
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National Childcare Investment 
Programme (NCIP) 
2006- 
ongoing 
Improve the supply and quality of early 
childhood care and education. Support 
disadvantaged families 
planning, grant 
aid 
Private and 
voluntary sector Weak 
Programme of Grants for Locally-
Based Community & Voluntary 
Organisations 
2004- 
ongoing 
Grants to community groups for equipment, 
education, training and research Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak 
RAPID (Revitalising Areas by 
Planning, Investment and 
Development) 
2001- 
ongoing 
Concentrate public expenditure on the most 
disadvantaged urban areas  
Planning, grant 
aid 
Local 
government, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
Remedial Works Scheme 1985- ongoing 
Grants for refurbishing run down social 
housing estates Grant aid 
Local 
government Weak  
Rural Renewal Scheme 1998-2006 Promote the development of commercial and residential buildings Fiscal relief Private sector Strong 
Special projects to Assist 
Disadvantaged Youth 
1988-
ongoing 
Support out-of school projects for young 
people Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak  
Springboard 1998-ongoing Provide intensive support for children at risk Grant aid Voluntary sector Weak 
Urban Project 1996-2006 Improve living standards in disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
Service 
provision and 
grant aid 
Local 
government, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
Urban Renewal Scheme 1986-2006 Promote the development of commercial and residential buildings Fiscal relief Private sector Strong 
Youth Diversion Scheme 2001- ongoing 
Divert young people from crime through 
community programmes 
Service 
provision and 
grant aid 
Gardaí and 
voluntary sector 
Weak 
Young People’s Facilities and 
Services Fund 
1998- 
ongoing 
Promote the development of commercial 
and residential buildings Grant aid 
Local 
government, 
voluntary sector 
Strong 
Village and Town Renewal 
Scheme 1998-2006 
Promote the development of commercial 
and residential buildings Fiscal relief Private sector Strong 
. 
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and the sub-national administrative units of the Health Services Executive also contributed 
significant funding to special area-based services for disadvantaged areas, sometimes 
through co-funding of activities also supported by central government and sometimes 
through separate projects. The range and number of funding heads and forms of support 
provided by these sub-national bodies were so great and so often tied up with other 
services and funding programmes that it was not possible to disentangle them in any 
comprehensive way. Therefore they are not included in the national picture in this section, 
though they are included as part of the estate-level picture presented later. Philanthropic 
funding could not be included at national level for the same reasons but it also is at least 
partly incorporated later in the estate-level analysis. The implication of the lack of central-
level data on sub-national programmes is that short of replicating our analysis of the 
individual estates presented below for every disadvantaged area in the country, there is no 
way of arriving at a comprehensive national summing up of the amount of public funding 
devoted to area-targeted anti-poverty measures in Ireland at present. What is presented in 
Table 3 is a next-best alternative – an estimate of central government expenditure in this 
area in the year 2006 – but the exclusion of spending by sub-national public agencies 
which this approach involves is likely to represent a significant undercount of the total at 
national level (though not at local estate level reported later). While it is often recognised 
that difficulties in estimating outputs and impacts are a feature of public spending 
programmes, here also we have to point to problems in quantifying expenditure inputs, a 
problem which does not auger well for the potential for good strategic management of the 
field of activity involved. 
 
Community Employment and Jobs Initiative schemes are included as area-targeted 
measures because of the priority accorded to disadvantaged areas targeted by the 
Partnerships in decisions regarding the allocation of CE schemes. However, the nature of 
expenditure on CE and JI schemes gives rise to a question whether all of that expenditure 
should be included in our measure of area-based spending. The issue here is that these 
schemes can be thought of as ‘add-ons’ to the social welfare system: they target the long-
term unemployed and lone parents who are outside the labour market and provide them 
with work placements in non-profit or public bodies which carry a stipend amounting to 
approximately 110 per cent of their weekly welfare payments. The objective is to draw 
those individuals into work-and-training schemes that are designed to reintegrate them into 
the labour market (we will return later to the question of how effective the schemes are in 
achieving this objective). Almost two-thirds of expenditure on these schemes is accounted 
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for by replacement of the welfare benefits that participants were previously in receipt of 
(the balance is accounted for by the 10 per cent add-on to those benefits that participants 
receive plus training costs and overheads). Thus, since a large part of CE and JI 
expenditure would have occurred anyway in the form of welfare payments had those 
schemes not existed, a case could be made that only the net added cost should be 
counted as area-based expenditure. Since we preferred to err on the conservative side in 
estimating area-based expenditure in this study, that is the approach we have adopted 
here. Based on national data on the numbers employed by those schemes and estimates 
of average welfare payments they otherwise would have received, we calculated that 65.9 
per cent of total expenditure on the schemes could be counted as welfare-benefit 
replacement, with the balance of 34.1 per cent making up the add-on element. Only the 
34.1 per cent of CE and JI expenditure that makes up this add-on element is counted here 
as part of our area-based expenditure totals.  
 
Table 3 presents data on expenditure for the programmes listed in Table 2. These 
programmes accounted for €641.2 million of central government spending in 1996 and 
€968.8 million in 2006, an increase of over 50 per cent over the period. However, the 
increase occurred at a time of rapid growth in both public expenditure as a whole and the 
wider economy and represented a small decrease relative to those benchmarks. The 
figure for 2006 was equivalent to 7.18 per cent of social security spending and 0.55 per 
cent of GDP, which represented a decline of about one-third in these ratios compared to 
1996. The Urban, Rural and Village and Town Renewal Schemes, as outlined earlier, are 
indirect anti-poverty measures in that they do not directly target the poorer segments of the 
population in poor neighbourhoods but seek rather to incentivise business investment and 
better-off residential settlement to move into such neighbourhoods. They accounted for 29 
per cent of area-based expenditure in 2006. If we excluded these measures and focused 
on those which were intended to benefit the poor directly, total area-based expenditure 
falls to €688 million in 2006 and €239 million in 1996. Of this total for 2006, some €393 
million was accounted for by programmes that utilised relatively weak spatial targeting 
criteria and so would be expected to show only limited concentration in deprived areas, 
while the balance of €295 million (excluding the tax expenditure programmes represented 
by Urban Renewal and Village and Town Renewal) amounted to €295 million.  
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Table 3  Central Government Expenditure on Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures, 
1996, 2006 
 
Expenditure in 
€m (2006 prices) Type 
 1996 2006  
Strong Spatially Targeting    
CLÁR (Ceantair Laga Árd-Riachtanais)  23.0 Capital 
DEIS (Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools) 11.4 50.8 Current
Local Drugs Task Forces  16.0 Current
Local Employment Service (LES) 6.2 23.2 Current
Partnerships and employment pacts 18.9 47.6 Current
RAPID (Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development) 4.1 Capital 
Rural Renewal Scheme  90.6 Capital 
Urban Renewal Scheme1,2 402.3 256.2 Capital 
Urban Project 12.8  Mixed 
Village and Town Renewal Scheme2  24.5 Capital 
Young Peoples Facilities and Services Fund2  40.0 Mixed 
Sub-total 451.6 576.1  
Weak Spatial Targeting     
Community employment and jobs initiative3 158.1 124.0 Current
Community Development Programme  8.0 20.2 Current
Community Services Programme  37.1 Current
Equal Opportunities Childcare Programme  40.04 Mixed 
Family and Community Services Resource Centre Programme 0.3 30.5 Current
Local authority social inclusion units  1.0 Current
Programme of Grants for Locally-Based Community & 
Voluntary Organisations  3.0 Mixed 
National Childcare Investment Programme  3.84 Mixed 
Remedial Works Scheme6 21.0 120.7 Capital 
Special projects to Assist Disadvantaged Youth 3.3 Current
Springboard  2.65 Current
Youth Diversion Programme 2.2 6.7 Current
Sub-total 189.6 392.7  
Total (strongly + weakly spatially targeted) 641.2 968.8  
Total as % of total public expenditure on social security 10.6 7.1  
Total as % of GDP 0.8 0.5  
Notes:  Expenditure data includes only central government spending and excludes spending by local government and sub 
national government agencies. 1 this includes spending on the operational areas of the Dublin Docklands Development 
Authority and Ballymun Regeneraton Ltd.  2These schemes did not involve direct government expenditure, but rather tax 
reliefs and associated tax revenue foregone. As data for tax revenue foregone in 2006 are not available, the estimate here is 
based on annual average tax revenue forgone between 1999 and 2004.  3Total expenditure has been reduced by 65.9% to 
take account of the value of social security benefits covered by the wages of participants, because this expenditure would 
have been incurred in the absence of these schemes. 4These schemes funded both private (for profit) and 
community/voluntary (non-profit) childcare facilities. The data here relate only to community/voluntary facilities, as these are 
more likely to have been targeted on disadvantaged areas. 5 Refers to expenditure in 2007. 6This scheme funded the Ballymun 
Regeneration project among other social housing estates regeneration projects. 
Source:  Government of Ireland (1998, 2008), Pobal (2007), Goodbody Economic Consultants (2005), ministries’ annual 
reports and information provided by ministries. 
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It is notable that the volume of spending accounted for by the programmes listed in Table 
3 is large. As the target populations for this spending varied greatly from programme to 
programme and in most cases are not precisely quantified, it is not possible to express the 
expenditure in terms of spending per person or per household of target population. 
However, an illustrative indication of what the expenditure might entail can be provided by 
estimating what the expenditure per household would be if it were wholly directed at the 
most disadvantaged households. If, for illustrative purposes, we excluded the tax 
expenditure programmes listed in Table 3 and focused on the €688 million accounted for 
by the other programmes in the table and if we were to assume that this expenditure were 
concentrated on the 10 per cent of households in the country that were most 
disadvantaged (approximately 147,000 households), we would arrive at estimate of 
average spend per household in that category for the year of €4,680, or €90 per week, a 
not insignificant amount. If we were to limit our attention to the share of that spending 
accounted for by programmes with strict spatial targeting criteria (i.e. those most likely to 
be concentrated in the kinds of disadvantaged areas represented by the estates in our 
study), the spend per household in 2006 would fall to €2,009, or €39 per week. These 
annual expenditure estimates of €4,680 and €2,009 per disadvantaged household derived 
from national data provide approximate upper and lower bounds of the expenditure we 
should expect to find when we move to the parallel estimates generated at estate level 
presented later in this chapter.  
 
These estimates are of course only illustrative since it is a feature of the programmes that 
they do not measure expenditure in these terms and, as we shall see further below, do not 
necessarily target the most disadvantaged households. The estimates are not intended as 
recommendations that ABIs be abolished and the funding converted into cash payments to 
households. However, it is important that full and accurate costing of programmes 
(including staffing, capital and overheads) be carried out, that costings for programmes 
with similar objectives targeted on particular neighbourhoods be placed alongside each 
other and (where justified by overlapping goals and remits) that they be aggregated to 
arrive at total expenditure amounts, and that appropriate metrics (such as expenditure per 
household in the targeted areas or per targeted beneficiary) be used to indicate the scale 
of expenditure. In the present instance, the illustrative estimates per disadvantaged 
household referred to indicate that the scale of the spending on ABIs at national level is 
substantial enough to make a significant difference to disadvantaged segments of the 
population if it were well directed and well deployed to meet their needs. 
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Due to the proliferation of separate area-based programmes described in the preceding 
section, spending in 2006 was channelled through many more conduits than was the case 
in 1996. Furthermore, the proportion of this spending derived from EU funding schemes 
declined as Ireland’s economy improved in this period. Table 3 also reveals a shift in the 
distribution of area-based spending in favour of strongly spatially targeted measures (as 
defined in Table 2). Spending on these grew by 29 per cent between 1996 and 2006, 
whereas spending on weakly spatially targeted measures grew by 1.07 per cent, largely 
because contraction in spending on the Community Employment and Jobs Initiative 
Schemes cancelled out increased spending in other areas. This is related in turn to a 
marked fall in long-term unemployment during these years. The growth of schemes that 
were strongly targeted in spatial terms benefited state bodies rather than community and 
voluntary sector agencies, particularly in local government and education, as many of the 
schemes of this type established from the mid-1990s channelled spending through these 
sectors. Although spending on programmes implemented by the community and voluntary 
sector also expanded between 1996 and 2006, by the latter year a larger proportion of this 
spending was linked to service provision (principally childcare, family support and 
addiction services), whereas in the former most of the schemes relevant to this sector 
funded more general community development activities. 
 
Table 3 also categorises measures as mainly capital (funding for buildings and infra-
structure), mainly current (subsidies for the running costs of agencies) and mixed (capital 
and current). Only six of the 24 measures were mainly capital investment, but these were 
generally high spending programmes and accounted for 47.6 per cent of total area-based 
expenditure in 2006. This is a slight decline in relative terms from 1996, when measures of 
this type accounted for 53.6 per cent of total spending on area-based programmes. Six of 
the programmes were mixed. The balance of 12 programmes focusing mainly on current 
expenditure accounted for 43.9 per cent of total spending. 
 
4.3 Estate level picture: inventory and sources of funding  
In order to establish what the national programmes just examined represented on the 
ground, the present study selected four of its seven case-study estates and sought to 
survey the nature and extent of services funded by area-based programmes and the 
expenditure associated with them in 2006. Fatima Mansions and Moyross were selected 
as two estates where expenditure on these programmes was at the higher end of the 
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range and Deanrock and Cranmore as two where it was at the lower end of the range. The 
results of this exercise are presented estate by estate in Tables 4 to 7 below. 
 
Method 
The compilation of these tables proved to be a complex and time-consuming matter – and 
the poor level of information on the activities under examination itself proved to be a 
revealing aspect of the exercise. Although standard auditing controls on the disbursement 
of funds seemed tight and effective, auditing information was not compiled into a form that 
allowed for the collation of information of the total level of spending on ABIs in particular 
estates. Only the Combat Poverty Agency and the Department of the Environment and 
Local Government were able to provide comprehensive breakdowns of all the ABI 
investment funded in the seven estates. This information gap reflects a key aspect of 
management of the programmes that we will highlight further below – their diffuse 
targeting mechanisms. For the most part, operational areas for programmes were so 
broadly targeted and so loosely incorporated into the rationale and design of programmes 
that they provided no platform on which to build tight spatial tracking of expenditure. In 
consequence, even though these programmes were conceived of as spatially targeted, 
tight spatial tracking of expenditure generally did not exist, and because of this the 
information base for estimating expenditure in particular estates was not available.  
 
Generally, the lack of central information required us to rely on information collected at 
estate level to estimate the scale of local spending. This first required that we identify and 
contact every local agency connected with the estates that might have received funding 
under these programmes and to compile from them an inventory of relevant activities and 
interventions that affected the estates. The second step was to request data on annual 
expenditure – and as the fieldwork was underway in 2008 it was decided to adopt 2006 as 
the reference for this purpose since annual accounts were more likely to be available for 
that year.  
 
Some of these organisations, such as family support and child care centres, were formally 
established single-purpose entities and in some cases it was a reasonably straightforward 
matter to establish how much funding they had received in 2006. However, the more 
common situation was that there were complex interlocking arrangements between 
organisations and it often proved difficult, if not impossible, to apportion expenditure or 
other supports between them. This complexity reflected the multiplicity, complexity and 
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time-limited character of much of the funding supports that were available from external 
sources. Within all of the estates, community organisations such as community centres or 
community development projects had emerged that acted as the interface between local 
groups and the external funding world. They provided umbrella services in helping local 
organisations to apply for funding, handle accounting and reporting requirements, employ 
staff, locate and access premises and deal with administrative matters such as payroll and 
insurance. In some cases, external funding would be secured through a community centre 
and then funnelled to the organisation on whose behalf it had been sought, while in other 
cases, the community centre would assign staff or allow access to premises or other 
facilities so that a smaller organisation could apply for funding and deal with any monies 
they received themselves. Staff employed under the Community Employment scheme, 
which as we saw earlier at national level represent a major form of support for community 
activity in disadvantaged areas, also provide many examples of inter-organisational 
functioning. In Fatima Mansions, for example, 29 CE staff were at work in various 
organisations in the estate in 2006, but a single umbrella organisation – Fatima Groups 
United – acted as their direct employer and distributed their services to the local 
organisations that were the intended beneficiaries.  
 
Such complexities in local flows of funding and other resources between organisations 
were so many and varied that we felt it might mislead more than it would illuminate to 
allocate expenditure amounts to each organisation or activity individually. Rather, we 
sought first to identify all the organisations or projects in the four estates that either 
received some funding or were allocated some staff resources (such as CE workers) from 
national or sub-national area-based programmes for sustained periods (that is, over weeks 
or months) at some time in 2006. We then sought to identify the external funding streams 
that could be traced as the ultimate source for these supports and to estimate the sum of 
the funding from each stream arriving into each estate. In order to link this analysis back to 
the national data on area-based programmes presented in Tables 2 and 3 above, we 
attempted to connect locally identified funding streams with national funding programmes. 
However, local groups were often better able to identify the government department or 
agency from which blocks of funding came, than the specific funding programme involved. 
Consequently, our tabulations sometimes identify the source department or agency rather 
than the source programme. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, estate-level funding 
streams from public sources do not always emanate solely from the national level but may 
include at least part-funding from local authorities or other sub-national bodies such as 
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regional administrative units of the Health Service Executive. These funding streams are 
included in our tables and the tables thus embody a somewhat broader representation of 
area-based programmes than is contained in the national picture presented earlier.  
 
Thus, with reference to the year 2006, we sought to create for each of the four estates, 
firstly, a list of organisations or projects that received public funding support; second, a 
check-list of external funding sources that provided those supports, and third, a sum-total 
of the expenditures on the supports of these kinds added together for each of the four 
estates. On the basis of the totals for estate-level expenditure arrived at from this exercise 
and taking account of the numbers of households in each estate, we were then also able 
to estimate the expenditure per household that the total external support for each estate 
represented.  
 
A feature of this approach is that the picture of estate-level activity we present here 
concentrates on organisations that are sufficiently established to merit funding or the 
allocation of significant resources such as CE workers to support their work. Excluded are 
the large numbers of voluntary organisations that are active in a more intermittent or ad 
hoc manner within estates, many of which interact with or are supported by the more 
formal layers of organisations in various ways. In fact, for many of the community 
development organisations and projects we identify, work with less established voluntary 
activities is often a major part of their role. Thus the organisations we count are best 
thought of as the formally organised tip of an iceberg of community activity that is present 
within estates, the bulk of which consists of less established niche activities that may be 
difficult to detect for all but those directly involved.  
 
The data on expenditure by the organisations we examined relates principally to current 
expenditure. Major public capital investment was also a significant feature in some of the 
estates around this period but because its deployment in individual estates tends to occur 
in large chunks over short and widely spaced intervals, its scale and impact cannot be 
represented meaningfully in data for a single year. Therefore, major capital projects are 
excluded from our tabulations of the data but we comment in passing on their significance 
in individual estates. In some cases current spending proved impossible to distinguish 
from small capital spending (on for instance fixtures and equipment) so small elements of 
capital expenditure are included in the tables.  
Table 4  Services Funded by Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures in Cranmore, 2006 
Funding programme/ agency 
Area based project Function 
C
om
m
unity 
Em
ploym
ent S
chem
e
D
elivering equality of  
O
pportunity in S
chools 
(D
E
IS
) 
D
orm
ant A
ccounts 
Fund 
E
qual O
pportunities
C
hildcare P
ro gram
m
e 
H
ealth S
ervices 
E
xecutive 
Local authority 
Local P
artnership 
C
om
pany 
Local E
m
ploym
ent 
S
ervice 
O
ther S
tatutory S
ource 
(area based) 
P
rivate and 
P
hilantro phic Sector
P
rogram
m
e of grants 
for locally based 
com
m
unity and 
voluntar y organisations 
R
em
edial W
ords 
S
chem
e 
R
A
P
ID
 
S
pecial Prpjects to 
assist disadvantaged 
youth
V
ocational E
ducation 
C
om
m
ittee 
Abbey Quarter Community Centre Youth work, childcare X    X    X  X     
Abbey Quarter Community Employment Scheme Education for adults X               
Cranmore Community Co-op Community development   X          X   
Cranmore Regeneration Project Estate regeneration   X   X      X    
Foroige the CRIB Youth work     X           
Jobs club/ jobs initiative/ back to work enterprise 
scheme 
Employment       X X        
Mercy College School Education for children, 
sports 
 X           X   
North Connacht Youth and Community Services Youth work X        X     X  
Resource House Project Family Support, childcare X   X X  X  X X     X 
Sligo Family Support Ltd. Family support, childcare    X X           
Sligo Leader Partnership Community development, 
youth work, recreation 
      X         
Sligo Sports and Recreation Partnership Sport & recreation X    X X          
Sligo Social Service Council Ltd. Family support, childcare X    X    X       
St Anne’s/ Avalon Centre Youth work, eldercare X    X        X   
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Table 5  Services Funded by Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures in Deanrock, 2006 
Funding programme/ agency 
Area-based project Function 
D
elivering equality 
of  O
pportunity in 
S
chools (D
E
IS
)  
Fam
ily &
 
C
om
m
unity 
Services 
C
om
m
unity 
E
m
plo ym
ent 
H
ealth S
ervice 
E
xecutive 
Local D
rugs Task 
Force 
O
gra C
orcai 
O
ther S
tatutory 
S
ource
P
obal 
V
ocational 
E
ducation 
C
om
m
ittee
Y
oung P
eoples’ 
Facilities and 
Services
Fund
Y
outh D
iversion 
program
m
e 
School Education for children X           
TACT (Youth Diversion 
Programme) 
Youth work   X        X 
Togher Community Centre Community development   X         
Togher Link Up Drug misuse     X       
Togher Family Centre Family Support Childcare  X  X   X X  X  
Togher Special Youth Project 
(SPY) 
Youth work      X   X   
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Table 6  Services Funded by Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures in Fatima Mansions, 2006 
Funding programme/ agency 
Area-based project Function 
A
R
K
 C
hildren's C
ultural 
C
entre 
C
ityarts 
C
ity of D
ublin Y
outh 
S
ervices B
oard 
C
lient C
ontributions 
C
om
m
unity D
evelopm
ent 
P
rogram
m
e 
C
om
m
unity E
m
ploym
ent 
C
om
bat P
overty A
gency 
D
elivering E
quality of  
O
pportunity in S
chools 
(D
E
IS
) 
Fatim
a R
egeneration 
Board * 
H
ealth S
ervices E
xecutive 
Irish Y
outh Federation 
Local D
rugs Task Force 
Local A
uthority 
Local  P
artnership 
C
om
pany 
N
ational C
hildcare 
Investm
ent P
rogram
m
e  
O
ther S
tatutory S
ource 
(area based) 
P
rivate/philanthropic 
S
ector 
Community Employment Scheme  Employment, training for adults      X            
Digital Community Project Education, training for adults         X        X 
Equality for Women Project Education, training for adults              X    
Fatima ArkLink  Arts, youth work X          X      X 
Fatima Children's Day Centre Childcare    X      X  X   X X  
Fatima Groups United  Community development     X       X      
Fatima Health Initiative Health promotion       X  X          
Fatima Homework Club Education for children, childcare        X      X  X X  
Fatima estate regeneration  Regeneration              X    X 
Fatima Regeneration Board Regeneration              X    X 
Fatima Youth Initiative Youth work          X        
Rialto Community Drug team  Drug misuse          X   X      
Rialto Family Centre Family support, childcare          X   X      
Rialto Learning Community Education, training for children                 X 
Rialto Youth Project outreach project in 
Fatima 
Youth work   X       X        
Schools Education for children        X          
Towersongs Arts, culture  X         X  X     
Note:  funded by the private sector via the public private partnership project for the regeneration of the estate. 
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Table 7 Services Funded by Area-Based Social Inclusion Measures in Moyross, 2006 
Funding programme/ agency 
Area based project Function 
C
om
m
unity D
evelopm
ent 
P
rogram
m
e 
C
om
m
unity E
m
ploym
ent 
D
elivering equality of  
O
pportunity in S
chools 
(D
E
IS) 
D
ept of the E
nvironm
ent 
Local authority 
H
ealth S
ervice E
xecutive 
Local E
m
ploym
ent S
ervice 
Local P
artnershipC
om
pany 
O
ther statutory source 
(area
based)
O
ther S
tatutory source 
(non
area
based)
N
ational C
hildcare 
Investm
entP
rogram
m
e
P
rivate/ philanthropic 
S V
ocational E
ducation 
C Youth D
iversion 
P
rogram
m
e 
Y
oung P
eople’s facilities 
and Services Fund 
Adult & Community Education Education for adults  X           X   
Bernardos Family support, childcare  X    X    X      
Blue Box Creative Learning Education for children   X   X      X    
Bursaries & Scholarships Education for adults        X    X    
CCYDG/ Youth Diversion Project Youth work, support for ex 
offenders 
 X            X  
Céim ar Céim (probation service) Training, support for ex offenders         X    X  X 
Community Development Programme Community development X X              
Corpus Christi Parish Community 
Employment Scheme 
Access to employment, training 
for adults, service provision. 
 X              
Limerick Youth Service Youth Intervention 
Project 
Youthwork  X    X    X   X  X 
Moyross Action Centre Welfare rights, community 
development 
       X        
Moyross Community Development Network Community development X               
Moyross Community Enterprise Centre Community development, support 
and premises for community 
projects, estate management 
 
X   X X  X  X      
Moyross Development Company Community development, support 
for community and enterprise 
projects 
         X  X    
Moyross Estate Management Housing management, resident 
participation regeneration    X X   X X       
Moyross Integrated Childcare Childcare, education for children      X  X   X     
Moyross Obair Assess to employment, training       X         
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Moyross Partners* Umbrella body for community 
groups 
        X       
Northside Learning Hub Education for children, youth 
work 
       X    X   X 
Respond! Childcare Childcare          X  X    
Respond! Housing Initiative Housing for vulnerable families    X X X    X      
School Education for children   X     X  X      
Suaimhneas Homelessness     X  X          
We’re OK (Northside youth initiative) Youthwork         X       X 
Note:  *received no significant funding in 2006.  
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The tables also identify activities which drew on funding provided by private sector and 
philanthropic bodies, although as is explained in the next section, we could not be sure we 
had a full picture of these sources of revenue. We comment in the next section on those 
estates where it is clear that philanthropic funding clearly was of major significance.  
Findings 
The results of the analysis of estate-level activity in the four estates are presented estate 
by estate in Tables 4 to 7. Looking first at general patterns revealed by these tables, a 
number of significant features emerge. 
 The number of community organisations which were funded by area-based 
programmes in 2006 is large: 22 in Moyross, 16 in Fatima Mansions and 15 in 
Cranmore. Deanrock is somewhat of an outlier in this regard as only five community 
services were in operation in this estate in 2006.  
 The national funding sources the estate-level organisations drew on were also 
numerous: 17 in Fatima Mansions, 15 in both Moyross and Cranmore, and 11 in 
Deanrock. The multiplicity of these funding sources translated into complex funding 
arrangements at local level. Twenty-one of the 57 organisations and projects listed 
drew on three or more sources of funding in 2006 and the vast majority drew on at 
least two sources. Funding arrangements for area-based services in Cranmore and 
Moyross appear particularly complex, as do arrangements for funding family support 
services in all estates. 
 All community based services in the estates relied to a considerable degree on 
Community Employment and Jobs Initiative Schemes for staff. In Cranmore, Deanrock 
and Moyross, a number of community based services employed staff of this type. In 
Fatima Mansions, a single umbrella body for community based services (Fatima 
Groups United) employed all of the CE/JI staff at work in the estate and assigned them 
to the various community services active in its area. However, these workers 
accounted for a smaller share of staffing in community services in Fatima Mansions 
than in other estates. 
 The large role played by Community Employment, both as a scheme in itself and in the 
role it plays in providing workers for other community programmes, means that it had a 
special place in the whole system of area-based interventions. Nominally, it is an active 
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labour market measure, that is, a means to support the long-term unemployed and lone 
parents to gain skills, develop networks relating to employment and make the transition 
back into the mainstream labour market. Evaluations of CE have shown that it has not 
been effective in these terms, even at times of buoyant demand in the labour market 
(Indecon International Economic Consultants, 2002; O’Connell, 2002). As a result calls 
have been made for it to be scaled back or abolished, and it has been argued that the 
numbers employed on CE schemes should have fallen to low levels when overall 
employment growth was strong in the first half of the 2000s (Grubb et al, 2009). 
However, in times of recession the case for CE-type employments schemes becomes 
stronger and they can be viewed as a useful means to add value to the social welfare 
system. With a modest additional expenditure over and above that which clients would 
receive in any event as social welfare recipients, they provide two social benefits: (1) it 
gives a valuable role in their communities to CE workers, many of whom otherwise 
would be marginalised and economically inactive, and (2) it helps sustain valuable 
social services and community organisations in disadvantaged areas. Viewed in these 
terms, the case for the CE scheme becomes stronger, and at least suggests that the 
terms under which it should be evaluated should not be restricted to those that arise 
under active labour market policy in the strict sense.  
 A large proportion of the projects funded by the area-based initiatives in these four 
estates provide key social services. Bearing in mind that some projects carry out 
several functions, 23 are concerned with child-care, family support and youth work 
services. Cranmore is serviced by a particularly large number of services of this type. A 
further 11 services are concerned with the provision of education and training for 
adults, enabling them to access paid employment and combating drug misuse. Fatima 
Mansions has a particularly large number of projects of this type. 
 An important positive feature of services provided in the estates is the inclusion within 
them of a range of preventive interventions designed to support families and individuals 
(especially young people) at high risk of seriously negative outcomes. Both the present 
and the original study of the seven estates emphasise the role of small groups of 
troublesome households or individuals in the dynamics of local neighbourhood decline 
and highlight the need for services to support them and minimise the disruption they 
cause to neighbours. (Note that this emphasis differs from that raised in the 
‘underclass’ literature, as described and criticised in the Irish case by Nolan and 
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Whelan (2000). Here we highlight small sub-groups of acutely disadvantaged 
households that are found within disadvantaged communities rather than general 
processes of cultural differentiation and detachment from mainstream society that the 
‘underclass’ approach says are characteristic of disadvantaged communities as a 
whole. The view adopted here of the acutely disadvantaged as marginalised minorities 
within poor neighbourhoods is consistent with the view of the majority in those 
neighbourhoods as at high risk of poverty but otherwise as sharing the same basic 
cultural processes of mainstream society.) Chief among the services which have grown 
up to meet such needs are family support interventions (such as the Springboard 
projects) which aim to intervene early and provide positive supports to families where 
children have been identified as at risk of neglect or abuse and thus as likely to come 
to the attention of the child protection services. None of our seven estates had family 
support services of this nature ten years ago, but now all have such local services 
(though the Deanrock version is somewhat less intensive and more weakly targeted 
than the others and already existed in a less developed form ten years ago). There 
also has been considerable development of services that target teenagers at risk of 
getting into trouble with the criminal justice system. These are now also present in all of 
the estates reviewed, and while not as recent or novel as family support services, they 
are now more extensive than ten years ago.  
These developments address what was identified as a central weakness in the policy 
response to social conditions in the worst-off local authority estates highlighted in our 
study ten years ago – the under-provision of services aimed at including and 
integrating problem or dysfunctional families and individuals, particularly those 
emphasising early intervention. Many of these were likely to be seen as ‘troublemakers’ 
by the mainstream of local residents and thus were often marginalised and regarded as 
deserving of eviction or exclusion. The emphasis on the extent and range of preventive 
services now in place to support families and young people in these circumstances is 
unlikely to be adequate, though there is yet no standard methodology for determining 
what the level of provision should be. However, real progress is evident in the estates 
in these areas and this progress must be counted as a significant achievement of the 
overall system of area-based programmes in Ireland.  
 Eight projects in the four estates are concerned with community development and 
support for community services, of which five are based in Moyross. Interviews with the 
staff of these projects indicate that most of their time is devoted to support for 
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community services, particularly by helping voluntary/community organisations to 
access funding and providing them with premises. Four estate regeneration and estate 
management projects are also based in the four estates, the mandate of which 
overlaps to an extent with the community development projects. Although estate 
management and estate regeneration projects generally include the relevant local 
authority and other statutory agencies, community development projects are 
independent of government. 
 
The funding streams identified in Tables 4 to 7, which emanate from government, 
accounted for the majority of the income of the organisations involved. Private and 
philanthropic sources also made contributions in certain cases, though with the exception 
of Fatima Mansions that contribution was generally small. Some organisations in the 
estates derived small amounts of income from charges they levied on users of services, 
and four in Moyross received private philanthropic support in 2006. The exceptional role of 
private funding in Fatima Mansions arose partly as a consequence of the public-private 
partnership through which the estate regeneration was financed. The terms of this 
partnership provided that in exchange for access to development land for private housing 
in the estate, the private developer who undertook the project contributed a ‘community 
dividend’ to local community, to be managed by Fatima Regeneration Board. This 
community dividend was originally set at €5.6 million, to be handed over as the private 
elements in the development were realised. As mentioned earlier, the recent crash in the 
property market in Ireland has raised doubts over the commercial status of the private 
housing in the estate and thus over the final amount of the community dividend to be paid. 
Nevertheless, sums provided to date have been an important resource for Fatima 
Regeneration Board. Particular projects in Fatima Mansions have also received large 
support from private philanthropy in the form of Atlantic Philanthropies. As we detail further 
below, these resources, when added to the public funding streams that have benefited the 
estate, have placed Fatima Mansions in an exceptionally well-resourced position 
compared to the other estates and have enabled it to provide a range and level of services 
to residents that are unmatched elsewhere. 
 
4.4 Scale of spending in estates 
The results of the costing of area-based expenditure at estate level in some cases echoed 
those at the national level in terms of the broad magnitude of expenditures, while in other 
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cases estate-level expenditures were considerably below the benchmark estimated earlier 
(namely, expenditures per household in 2006 had expenditure been targeted on the 10 per 
cent most disadvantaged households in the state). The data are shown in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 Current Public Expenditure on Area-Based Initiatives in Four Estates, 2006 
Estate Total 
Expenditure (€) 
Estimated no 
of Households1
Expenditure per 
Household (€) 
Expenditure per 
household indexed 
to average 
Cranmore 1,337,892 511 2,618 85 
Deanrock 309,370 336 921 30 
Fatima 536,679 150 3,578 116 
Moyross 4,041,135 1,014 3,985 129 
All Four Estates 6,225,076 2,011 3,0962 100 
Note: Expenditure on Community Employment and Jobs Initiative Schemes was adjusted to remove the 
benefit replacement element which is estimated at 65.9 per cent of total expenditure on these schemes. 
Quoted amounts for these schemes thus equate to 34.1 per cent of total expenditure on these schemes (see 
text, p. 33). 1Because estate boundaries do not correspond to the small areas used for the census of 
population, and there is no definitive information available from other sources, the number of households had 
to be locally estimated for each estate. 2This is the average of expenditure per household weighted by the 
size of the estate, or alternatively is equal to total spending across all four estates divided by the total 
number of households. 
 
This table demonstrates that public expenditure on area-based initiatives in the four 
estates totalled €6,225,076 in 2006, or €3,096 per household. This estimate of per 
household expenditure in the four estates is considerably below the illustrative national 
expenditure estimate arrived at earlier on the basis of an assumption that all spending 
from national programmes were concentrated estimates. Expenditure per household in 
both Fatima Mansions and Moyross was above this average, but in both cases per 
household expenditure was also below the level which might be expected based on the 
national expenditure estimates presented above. In Deanrock and Cranmore, by contrast, 
area-based spending was significantly below the norm in the two other estates – €921 per 
household in the former and €2,618 in the latter. In both estates this low expenditure 
reflected extensive reliance on the Community Employment Scheme for staffing 
community projects, whereas use of (comparatively more expensive) salaried staff was 
more commonly employed to implement ABIs in Moyross and particularly in Fatima 
Mansions. The low expenditure in Deanrock understates the funding received by 
organisations based within that estate as many of the clients for their services were drawn 
from the wider Togher area rather than Deanrock itself. In keeping with the methodology 
we employed in all the estates, expenditures for Deanrock were adjusted downwards so 
as to include only the share accounted for by Deanrock residents.  
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In some cases these public funds were supplemented by private and philanthropic funding 
and, as already mentioned, investment by the latter was especially large in Fatima 
Mansions – it amounted to the equivalent of approximately €4,500 per household in that 
estate in 2006. ABIs in Moyross received funds from a philanthropic foundation 
established by the businessman JP McManus and by the Dell computer company, 
although we were unable to capture the value of this investment. As mentioned above, in 
Deanrock and Cranmore the private and philanthropic sectors did not make a significant 
contribution to funding area-based services.  
 
4.5 Impact 
As outlined earlier, information on inputs to area-based initiatives at estate level is patchy 
and difficult to fill in with any degree of completeness. It is scarcely surprising, then, that no 
rigorous assessment can be made of the impact of these initiatives. Writing in 2003, 
Haase and McKeown found that ‘little is known about the actual impact of the area-based 
Partnerships and even less about the comparative value of different approaches to 
tackling poverty and deprivation’ (Haase and McKeown 2003:iii). Their call for a more 
scientific approach to monitoring has since gone mostly unheeded and the information 
needed for effective monitoring of programmes is still largely absent. The present study 
has established that the scale of initiatives deployed in each estate is in most cases 
collectively large enough to have substantial impact. This in itself is significant since it 
eliminates the possibility that the programmes were too small to make a real difference. 
However, it was beyond the scope of a point-in-time study such as ours to generate the 
trend data and control variables that would have been necessary to provide well-grounded 
impact assessment. Nevertheless, we can offer some broad comment on a range of 
issues connected with impact. We do this first by presenting statistical indicators that, 
taken together with national evaluations of the ABIs and local interviews with activists who 
implement initiatives in the estates, throw some light on the possible effects of these 
initiatives. In addition, we comment on three characteristics of these programmes which 
bear heavily on their effectiveness, namely, their targeting, design and governance.  
 
Statistical indicators 
Indirect evidence on the possible impact of area-based programmes can be derived by 
examining change in statistical indicators of deprivation at electoral district (ED) level for 
the ten area-based programmes that adopted the ED as their spatial unit. For each of 
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these programmes it is possible to identify the EDs the programme selected, calculate the 
share of the national population that was included in the targeted EDs, and track the 
average change in the Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation in those EDs between 
1996 and 2006. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 9. The information on 
targeting, as measured by population share covered by the different programmes, is a 
revealing aspect of this table and we return to it in the next section. Here we focus on 
change in the Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation for the period covered by the 
table, 1996-2006. During this decade the mean score for Ireland as a whole increased by 
5.2, indicating an increase in affluence. Improvement was tilted considerably in favour of 
the most disadvantaged EDs – the 10 per cent of EDs that were the least affluent in 1996 
improved by 11.9 points while the 10 per cent of EDs that were most affluent marginally 
lost ground (a decline of 1.3 points).  
 
Looking at the outcomes in the EDs targeted by the ten area-based programmes, average 
change was positive in all cases and in all except one case (the Local Employment 
Service) was at least as good as the national average. However, the gain in these areas 
over and above the national average gain was modest. In no instance was it as great as 
that recorded by the 10 per cent of least affluent EDs and in only two instances (CLÁR and 
RAPID) did it exceed the national average gain by two points or more. At first sight, 
therefore, it would seem that the impact of the programmes was modest at best in that 
they did little to add to the general upsurge in prosperity that occurred in Ireland over the 
ten years 1996-2006. We cannot attach too much significance to this finding since it is 
possible that the modest average improvement in areas targeted by these programmes 
conceals larger improvements in particularly deprived sub-areas, perhaps helped by a 
channelling of resources into the poorest neighbourhoods by the programmes in question. 
This possibility cannot be tested in light of the poor information on neighbourhood-level 
distribution of resources by these programmes noted earlier. Rather, a less positive 
possibility suggests itself – that area targeting of the programmes was poor and did not 
live up to the logic of strict spatial channelling of resources that ostensibly motivated the 
whole area-based movement in social policy. It is thus to the question of targeting that we 
now turn.  
 
Table 9  Targeting and Impact of Area-Based Interventions with Strong Spatial Targeting, 1996 and 2006 
Share of 
national 
population 
in target 
areas (%) 
Mean Index of 
Relative 
Affluence and 
Deprivation 
Score of Target 
Neighbourhoods 
Change in  Mean 
Index of Relative 
Affluence and 
Deprivation 
Score of Target 
Neighbourhoods 
Intervention Targeting Criteria 
2006 1996 2006 1996-2006 
CLÁR (Ceantair Laga Árd-
Riachtanais) 
Severe population decline between 1926 and 1996, averaging 
50% 18.1 -0.9 7.0 7.8 
Local Development 
Partnerships (urban) Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation 74.9
1 3.4 9.0 5.6 
Local Development 
Partnerships (rural) Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation 78.4
2 6.2 11.4 5.2 
Local Drugs Task Forces 
Drug treatment data (especially on opiate dependency); police 
crime statistics; data relating to school attendance/drop-out and 
data on social and economic disadvantage 
17.7 0.1 6.3 6.2 
Local Employment Service 
(LES) Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation 56.9 5.9 10.5 4.6 
RAPID (Revitalising Areas by 
Planning, Investment and 
Development) 
Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation 
Levels of social housing. Designated disadvantaged schools 15.3 -3.8 4.0 7.8 
Rural Renewal Scheme Long-term population decline, low economic growth, lack of urban centres 3.0 0.5 7.2 6.6 
Urban Renewal Scheme Population and economic decline, social problems, dereliction 12.2 -1.3 4.6 6.0 
Urban Project Bidding from 10 most disadvantaged areas Nav Nav Nav Nav 
Village and Town Renewal 
Scheme Population and economic decline, social problems, dereliction 5.2 .4 6.5 6.0 
Young Peoples Facilities and 
Services Fund 
Drugs Task Force target areas and three additional cities and 
one town 21.9 1.1 6.6 5.5 
Comparators     
Ireland as a whole 100 5.2 10.4 5.2 
Decile 1 (most affluent) 23.1 21.0 19.7 -1.3 
Decile 10 (least affluent) 11.0 -15.2 -3.3 11.9 
Note:  The neighbourhoods designated under the area based measures all refer to 2006, with the exception of: Local Development Partnerships (rural) – 2008 
designation; RAPID – 2005 designation; the Urban Renewal Scheme – refers to all neighbourhoods designated under the lifetime of this programme (i.e. 1985-
2006). 1 Percentage of urban population.  2 Percentage of rural population.  
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Targeting 
As mentioned earlier, effective targeting of scarce resources is one of the key rationales 
proffered by government and researchers for the use of area-based initiatives. In view of the 
importance of these rationales, the under-development of arrangements for targeting area-
based investment in Ireland is striking. Among the 26 local development measures under 
examination here only 11 adopt explicit spatial targeting criteria, and even then these criteria 
were often inappropriate, loose or ineffective. For instance, the CLÁR programme defined 
target areas solely on the grounds of population decline, a poor measure of disadvantage, 
and the Rural Renewal Scheme was targeted in a similar way.  
 
Weaknesses in targeting were found to be especially evident in four schemes that were 
designed to support schools in disadvantaged areas when these were evaluated by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (2006). This evaluation found that:  
 over three-quarters of schools in the country benefited from at least one of the schemes; 
 different qualifying criteria were used for each scheme, with the result a school might 
qualify for some types of support, but not others;  
 some targeting decisions were based on information supplied by school principals which 
raises concerns about the accuracy of this information; 
 targeting decisions were rarely reviewed, so schools remained eligible for additional 
funding, even if their socio-economic profile improved, while there was no mechanism for 
including those schools whose profiles disimproved after initial targeting decisions were 
reached (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2006).  
These concerns were addressed when the various supports for disadvantaged schools were 
amalgamated into the DEIS scheme in 2005. They were thenceforth subject to the same 
targeting criteria (Department of Education and Science, 2005), though it remains to be seen 
whether they thereby came to be more concentrated on disadvantaged pupils. 
 
Decisions regarding the spatial focus of the partnerships were reached using what was 
apparently more robust methodology, namely ED scores on the Index of Relative Affluence 
and Deprivation (Haase and Pratschke, 2005). More recently this index has also been used to 
target the Local Employment Service and RAPID. Despite the technical sophistication of the 
Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation, the effectiveness of the targeting it allows for is 
 hampered by the limitations of the underlying data. It is based on data on the Electoral 
Division (ED), the smallest area unit for which census data are collected for the whole 
country. However, these 3,340 units include varying number of residents, and their 
boundaries, which have not been comprehensively updated for decades, no longer reflect 
contemporary settlement patterns, particularly in urban areas (Haase and Pratschke, 2005). 
This issue is currently being addressed by the Census authorities, and it is envisaged that 
more robust small area census data will be available from Census 2011. 
 
Even given the limitations of EDs as spatial units, the data on targeting of programmes listed 
in Table 9 above reveal two problems, keeping in mind that these programmes were 
ostensibly set up to tackle disadvantaged black-spots. First, a number of the programmes 
have so relaxed their targeting criteria that in fact they embrace over half the population – 
74.9 per cent of the urban population in the case of the urban partnerships, 78.4 per cent of 
the rural population in the case of the rural Leader partnerships, and 56.9 per cent of the 
national population for the Local Employment Service. In only two instances, the Rural 
Renewal Scheme and the Village and Town Renewal Scheme, do targeted areas account for 
less than 10 per cent of the national population.  
 
Secondly, the areas targeted by the programmes are not particularly disadvantaged – and 
this is true of programmes with a narrower spatial reach as well as those that are more 
broadly spread. The Village and Town Renewal Scheme, for example, is directed at areas 
that embrace only 5.2 per cent of the national population, but the average score of those 
areas on the Index of Relative Affluence and Deprivation is far above that of the least affluent 
decile of EDs (6.5 versus -3.3 respectively in 2006). In fact, in none of the sets of EDs 
targeted by the programmes is the average affluence score as low as that for the most 
disadvantaged decile of EDs and in the case of both the rural Leader partnerships and the 
Local Employment Services, targeted EDs are at least as well off as the national average. 
Generally speaking, EDs that were served by programmes with a narrower spatial reach 
showed somewhat larger increases in affluence in the period 1996-2006 than EDs in more 
widely targeted programmes. However, this cannot be taken to mean that the former showed 
greater reductions in disadvantage since they were not particularly disadvantaged to start 
with. Thus, we can conclude that ineffective targeting was a central feature of area-based 
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 anti-poverty measures in this period and greatly reduces the likely impact of those measures 
on genuinely disadvantaged areas.  
 
Design 
In addition to poor targeting, a range of other shortcomings in the design of area-based 
measures are raised repeatedly in the evaluation literature and are borne out by our 
observations on the ground in the seven case study estates. 
 Funding arrangements under the programmes are generally short-term and on the 
margins of the mainstream system, while the complex socio-economic problems they seek 
to address often demand lengthy intervention and attention from mainstream agencies. 
Individual projects often managed to endure for a considerable time but only because, as 
programme managers often complained, they spent much of their time and resources 
making funding applications, juggling with many different, short-term funding streams, and 
dealing with the complex paperwork involved in this. The complex and constantly shifting 
parameters of the funding environment meant that many community development projects 
and organisations at local level had evolved into agencies whose major role was to serve 
as an interface between funders and smaller, less well-resourced organisations in the 
neighbourhood.  
 The financially insecure, marginal status of many projects did not mean that their activities 
were on the edges of what is normally counted as mainstream social services provision. In 
the early 1990s, the bulk of area-based expenditure could justifiably be regarded as 
marginal in the sense that it was directed at non-mainstream community development or 
‘once off’ interventions such as inner city and social housing estate regeneration. By 2006, 
however, services such as childcare provision (funded under the EOCP) and 
environmental improvement (funded by RAPID and CLÁR), which would generally be 
regarded as mainstream government responsibilities, had come to account for a 
significant share of area-based expenditure. This gives rise to an impression of area-
based programmes not as innovative ‘add-ons’ to the mainstream system but as means to 
meet shortfalls in mainstream provision.   
 Evaluations of the area-based interventions, and the wider good practice literature in this 
field, highlight the importance of responsiveness to distinctive patterns of local need and 
thus of flexibility in programme design (Bamber et al, 2010). In reality, many of the area-
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 based measures examined here fund a restricted range of projects under terms and 
allocation procedures decided by central government. This tendency is particularly strong 
in programmes established since the mid-1990s such as RAPID, CLÁR and the EOCP.  
 In interviews in all of the seven estates, community activists complained that the reporting 
requirements imposed by funding agencies were onerous and often differed between 
funding agencies contributing to a single project. In view of the limited utilisation of the 
information provided by these agencies for robust evaluation of programmes, the value of 
these onerous reporting arrangements is open to question. 
 
There were instances in the seven estates where these problems had been overcome, at 
least to some degree. The Togher Family Centre, for example, which is based in Deanrock, 
had long struggled with problems of insecure funding but in 2005 it secured a somewhat 
longer-term funding agreement with the Health Service Executive. This was regarded within 
the Centre as a major development which had eased the Centre’s sense of insecurity and 
enabled it to plan for the long-term development of the service. In Fatima Mansions the 
‘community dividend’ arising from the Public Private Partnership used to regenerate the 
estate had enabled local community groups to escape the restrictions of rigid central funding 
criteria. It thus gave flexibility and local discretion in funding allocations. As a result, 
innovative community projects were funded and existing community projects continued after 
previous funding had ended.  
 
Governance 
Concerns raised in a number of reports by government and other commentators over the past 
decade have inspired reforms to arrangements for the governance to area-based 
programmes at both central and local level (see, most notably, Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 1996, 1999; National Economic and Social Forum, 1999). 
 
At central level the Cabinet Social Inclusion Committee has been assigned ultimate 
responsibility for setting priorities in relation to the area-based measures. Responsibility for 
policy development and programme design has been concentrated on the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, which was established in 2002 (and since March 
2010, Department of Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs) with this as a major part of 
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 its brief. Responsibility for administering the schemes has been concentrated in an agency 
called Pobal (formerly Area Development Management Ltd., which was set up initially as an 
intermediary body to manage the Local Partnership Companies). Pobal operates under the 
Department of Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs. In 2006 the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs held responsibility for nine of the 23 area-based 
measures in operation that year. Responsibility for the remainder was distributed among six 
other ministries, and seven intermediate agencies (if local government is classified as a single 
agency) played a role in their management. These numbers represent some degree of 
concentration in the agencies involved in recent years – Teague (2006) estimates that in 2000 
area-based measures were managed by eight separate government departments and thirteen 
different agencies.  
 
Despite this recent concentration of administrative bodies, central responsibility for the area-
based programmes remains fragmented. Cross-departmental co-ordination is rare (the Office 
of the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs is an exception), as is evaluation of the 
effectiveness of existing co-ordination structures before new programmes are introduced 
(NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit, 2003). Even those programmes that were brought together under 
the responsibility of the Department of Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs tended to 
retain the identity and procedures they possessed before they arrived into their new 
departmental home and have been no better integrated than those that are scattered across a 
number of different departments. The role of Pobal as the national administrative agency for a 
number of programmes has equally failed to enhance national coordination, since its remit is 
to act as an administrative conduit for a number of different funding streams rather than as a 
coordination agency that might seek to impose some order on how those programmes could 
work together or complement each other in pursuit of common basic goals. Since December 
2009, two programmes conducted under the aegis of the Department of Community, Equality 
and Gaeltacht Affairs, namely, the Community Development Programme and the Local 
Development and Social Inclusion Programme, were terminated and superseded by a new 
single programme, the Local and Community Development Programme, thus enhancing the 
potential for coordinated action in this area. 
 
At local level, a series of reforms to the governance of area-based measures has been 
introduced in recent years. Firstly, between 2003 and 2007, some partnerships and 
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 community groups were amalgamated in an effort to reduce the number of service delivery 
bodies, ensure that a single body is responsible for delivering these functions in a given 
geographical area and improve service co-ordination (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2007). Secondly, efforts have been made to integrate local government and the area-based 
measures. Despite ambitious objectives, this process is characterised by false starts and 
limited meaningful progress. Its origins can be traced to 1994 when County Strategy Groups 
were established in each of the major local authorities to co-ordinate the area-based 
measures. The 1996 White Paper on local government reform recommended that these 
should be developed into Community and Enterprise Groups tasked with co-ordinating local 
government and the area-based measures and planning for the integration of the two sectors 
(Department of the Environment, 1996). However, this was overtaken by the publication of the 
Task Force on the Integration of Local Government and Local Development report in 1998 
which proposed the establishment of County and City Development Boards tasked with the 
co-ordination of all public services at local government level, including the area-based 
measures. These were set up in 1999 and afforded statutory recognition by the Local 
Government Act of 2001.  
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The impact of these reforms appears to have been limited. Research on the CDBs, published 
in 2003, acknowledged that they are efficiently run, that they have provided a valuable 
networking forum and that their service co-ordination strategies fulfil an important planning 
function. However, it also concluded that ‘they have failed to effect greater co-ordination and 
integration’ of area-based social inclusion measures (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit, 2003:iv). The 
lack of robust local level data on the provision and funding of services, including area-based 
measures, was a contributor to this outcome, but a far more significant driver was the lack of 
authority underpinning their co-ordination function, coupled with the multiplicity of measures, 
responsible ministries and government agencies and the underdevelopment of national level 
arrangements for their co-ordination. In view of these arrangements the report concludes that 
‘The task that the CDBs… were set was extremely ambitious and perhaps even unrealistic in 
some respects’ (NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit, 2003:iv). Due to its recent completion, any 
attempt to assess the impact of the Partnerships’ ‘cohesion’ process would be premature.  
However, the relatively modest scope of this reform merits comment. Its failure to further 
integrate the Partnerships with the local government runs counter to the thrust of public policy 
on this issue, and the rationale behind the decision not to do so is unclear. 
 
  
The evidence collected at estate level indicates that the failure to streamline governance has 
also created problems for community groups. Community activists complained that the need 
to interact with diverse bodies involved in local planning for area based investment placed a 
considerable burden on their organisations. For example, a resident of Fettercairn who 
worked as a community development officer for the estate reported that she devoted the bulk 
of her work time to participating in committees linked to RAPID, the Local Partnership 
Company and the CDB. Other interviewees highlighted considerable overlap in the local 
development planning work carried out under the auspices of these three programmes. At the 
same time, several community activists raised concerns about the possible amalgamation of 
these bodies into the local government system on the grounds that local authorities may not 
have the capacity to manage these programmes effectively. The large number of separate 
funding schemes in operation, the rigidity of their terms and the different and often onerous 
reporting arrangements employed by different funders also raised significant challenges for 
community groups. For instance, a community activist from Finglas South complained: 
projects are completely flooded with evaluations, checkups, financial audits, 
personnel audits … it’s time-consuming and in smaller projects the amount of 
time a team leader who might have been a worker … puts aside one day a 
week to do the admin..., that person is now lost to the team and there’s a lot of 
frustration around that, a huge amount of frustration around that ... and people 
are having difficulty with it. 
 
Variations in the reporting requirements for the different area-based programmes 
administered by Pobal were also commonly criticised. These variations relate to the range of 
government departments from which funding originated and which Pobal had to reflect in its 
administrative procedures for different schemes. Interviewees also complained that inflexible 
terms for area-based funding schemes decreased the efficiency of projects on the ground. 
For instance, interviewees working in the drug treatment area highlighted difficulties in 
accessing funding to address emerging problems such as cocaine use via the Local Drug 
Task Forces, while local authorities highlighted difficulties in raising funding for the aspects of 
regeneration projects that did not entail refurbishment / physical works on estates. 
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 4.6 Interventions through social housing  
So far we have considered area-based interventions of a general kind. However, a particular 
interest arises in the case of local authority estates in the role of their landlords – the local 
authorities – in the estates. One widespread (but not universal) change that occurred in the 
seven estates was a general improvement in the relationship between local authorities and 
tenants. This was evidenced by positive comment from residents and a decline in the type of 
criticism and complaint about local authorities that was widespread in the past. Ten years ago 
most of the complaints we heard from tenants related to the local authority, but in the present 
study, the focus had shifted to the failings of other service providers in areas such as health, 
social care and local development. 
 
Our research examined the link between this development and principal social housing 
management reforms which occurred on the case study estates during the past decade (and 
which could be seen as part of a wider reform programme in local government over that 
period – see Forde, 2005). Four categories of reforms in social housing management can be 
identified: 
 
 the changing role of the social housing officer (re-conceptualisation) 
 the entry of the new actors into the social housing sector (externalisation) 
 the emergence of more sophisticated strategies to address the physical and social decline 
of estates (regeneration) 
 and reforms to the management of the social housing service (managerialisation). 
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Improving relations between local authorities and tenants seemed to arise mainly from a re-
conceptualisation on the part of local authorities of the social housing management function. 
As mentioned above, this traditionally was defined as primarily a property-focused, 
bureaucratic task and delivered in a centralised, paternalistic manner. By 2007, a qualitative 
shift in interactions between tenants and housing managers was evident, characterised by: 
greater visibility of managers on estates and the development of stronger relationships with 
tenants, leading to a more responsive service which has contributed in turn to a strong focus 
on addressing the problem of anti-social behaviour. The latter is now redefined as a core 
housing management responsibility, rather than entirely outside the landlord’s remit, as had 
previously been the case. These changes were operationalised by the appointment of local 
 
 estate officers, responsible for the management of individual estates or groups of estates in 
all of the local authorities under examination and the appointment of officials with specific 
responsibility for combating anti-social behaviour in most of these.  
 
Localisation of housing management has had almost uniformly beneficial impact on the case 
study estates and we came across many examples of good practice in this regard. Efforts to 
combat anti-social behaviour have been more mixed. However, where effective action of this 
type was taken by local authorities and other relevant agencies, such as in Fatima Mansions, 
it played a key role in stabilising troubled estates. Conversely, where effective action of this 
type was lacking, for instance in Moyross, this played a key role in further destabilising the 
estate, despite the continuing strength of community structures there.  
 
The second significant development in the social housing sector during the past decade has 
been the emergence of more sophisticated regeneration strategies to overcome the physical 
and social decline of some social rented estates. Ten years ago regeneration strategies had 
been put in place on some of the seven case study estates but these were heavily focused on 
physical improvements generally via refurbishment. By 2006 the emphasis of regeneration 
programmes had shifted in two significant ways. First, although a strong emphasis on bricks-
and-mortar issues had persisted, the focus had changed from refurbishment of existing 
dwellings to their demolition and, in most cases, replacement with new dwellings. For 
example, the Fatima Mansions complex was demolished in 2003 and rebuilt in 2006, sections 
of the Cranmore estate were de-tenanted in 2006 in preparation for demolition, the flats in 
Deanrock were demolished in 2006 and demolition of some sections of the Moyross estate 
was undertaken as part of a wider programme to regenerate the entire social housing stock in 
Limerick City. Secondly, a new emphasis on social, community and housing management 
interventions emerged as part of regeneration strategies. The origins of this development can 
be traced to efforts to consult tenants about the design of regeneration schemes and the 
estate management reforms. Subsequently, efforts to diversify the tenure structure of social 
housing estates, by introducing either private owners or other types of social landlord, 
became more prominent.  
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The evidence from the case study estates indicates that adding community development, 
social inclusion and housing management interventions to estate regeneration generally had 
 
 a positive impact. This finding reflects the international experience in this field which indicates 
that multi-faceted interventions are necessary for effective regeneration (Kintrea, 2007). 
However, the practice in Ireland of providing these interventions by agencies other than local 
authorities or other social landlords, which contrasts with the norm elsewhere in Europe, 
created significant co-ordination problems on some estates. Quite elaborate coordination 
structures had to be set up in Cranmore and to a lesser extent Fatima Mansions. The 
international experience is that tenure diversification can help regeneration particularly in very 
large social housing estates where concentrations of disadvantage can occur. However, in 
Ireland, estates that would be considered large by European standards are few in number. 
Among the seven social housing estates in the present study, only Moyross and Fettercairn 
could be considered large and both already include a large number of non-social renting 
households as a result of sales of dwellings to tenants. In smaller social estates located in 
mixed tenure areas, such as Fatima Mansions, the arguments for tenure diversification are 
less convincing. The Fatima Mansions case also highlights the limitations of tenure 
diversification as an income diversification strategy. In this case most of the private 
apartments have been acquired by investors rather than owner occupiers. Kintrea and Muir’s 
(2009) research on Ballymun in north Dublin found that most of the private housing built as 
part of its regeneration programme was also sold to investors. In many cases these dwellings 
were let to rent supplement claimants who must be welfare-dependent in order to qualify for 
this support.  
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Two further contrasting points can be made about the built environment aspects of 
regeneration strategies. On the one hand, strategies to redesign the public spaces of estates 
have become more sophisticated and generally more successful in recent years. For instance 
in Deanrock and Fettercairn, the strategic provision of in-fill housing closed off alleyways and 
increased passive surveillance by residents of open areas. Both of these types of spaces had 
previously been sites for anti-social behaviour. Recent physical regeneration programmes in 
the case study estates were also guided by detailed master-plans, in contrast to the norm ten 
years ago. On the other hand, the heavy reliance on interventions focused on buildings, which 
was evident during our first visits ten years ago, tended to continue. Three of the seven case 
study estates (Moyross, Fatima Mansions and Cranmore) were extensively refurbished 
between 1997 and 2006; two (Fatima Mansions and Deanrock) had previously been 
refurbished in the preceding decade and two (Cranmore and Moyross) were scheduled for 
 
 further refurbishment. Nationally a large proportion of the local authority stock was also 
refurbished. The Remedial Works Scheme financed the refurbishment of 13,576 dwellings 
between 1985 and 2004, which constitutes 12 per cent of all local authority dwellings in the 
latter year (Treadwell Shine and Norris, 2006). In later years, the bricks-and-mortar 
interventions became more radical and demolition was more commonly used. Among the 
case study estates, the extent of demolition sometimes seemed to exceed the problems it 
was intended to address. In Cranmore for instance, a significant number of structurally sound 
and well designed dwellings were demolished in 2009 to no obvious benefit. By contrast in 
Deanrock, where the flats complex were highly stigmatised and provided poor quality 
accommodation and a focus for anti-social behaviour, demolition successfully eliminated 
those problems. It is also important to acknowledge that demolition is highly destabilising of 
estate communities. In some estates, such as Fatima Mansions, where community structures 
are strong they can withstand the effects of this intervention. In Muirhevnamor, however, 
interviewees expressed concern that if plans for the demolition of large sections of the estate 
were implemented, this would have a negative impact on the fabric of the community. 
 
The third significant development in the social housing sector in this period was that certain 
functions which were previously the direct responsibility of local authorities, such as the 
provision of social housing and the regeneration of estates, were externalised to quasi-
governmental, non-profit sectors and in some cases to private sector organisations. For 
instance sections of Cranmore and Moyross were transferred into the ownership of housing 
associations as part of regeneration schemes. However, by 2007, some aspects of this 
externalisation process had been reclaimed by the local authorities as part of their growing 
strategic management remit, while for various reasons the limits of other aspects of this 
agenda had been reached. 
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Rent supplement is an example of the former development. Due to concerns about the 
escalating costs of this benefit and the poor quality of the accommodation procured under its 
auspices, in 2004 the government decided that local authorities would take over responsibility 
for all claims of 18 months or more duration under the Rental Accommodation Scheme 
(RAS). The use of PPPs for social housing regeneration, which had been utilised only in 
Fatima Mansions, is an example of a local, rather than central government-driven 
externalisation. Although the PPP regeneration scheme delivered significant benefits in 
 
 Fatima Mansions, later schemes along these lines failed in the face of collapsing demand for 
housing and cast doubts on the transferability of this model to other contexts. Externalisation 
of social housing provision to housing associations continued during the decade under 
examination, however, and the local authority officials we interviewed expressed mixed views 
about this. Some criticised the sector for ‘cherry picking’ tenants and complained that the 
inclusion of housing association dwellings in some of the seven estates created logistical 
difficulties for neighbourhood management and regeneration. Others welcomed the 
alternative source of housing offered by these organisations and suggested that it would lead 
to improved service and choice for tenants. One experienced senior local authority manager 
expressed the hope that they take over as the main providers of social housing in Ireland, as 
this would enable local authorities to concentrate on strategic planning and would also 
increase the independence of the social housing sector from central government. However, 
he raised concerns about the structure of the housing association sector. It consists, on the 
one hand, of a handful of very large providers which own approximately half the stock and 
which he suggested ‘are as large and bureaucratic as any local authority’, and on the other 
hand, of a multitude of small providers with no paid staff, many of which would have little 
interest in developing new housing schemes.  
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The extensive effort at reform of local government which commenced in Ireland with the 
publication of the White Paper Better Local Government in 1996 provides the backdrop for 
these developments in social housing (Forde, 2005; Meldon, Kenny and Walsh, 2004). The 
reform programme has sought to enhance local democracy and improve the efficiency of local 
services. While doubts have been raised about the degree to which the programme has 
succeeded in its aim of shifting power from central to local government and from local officials 
to citizens (Forde, 2005), reviews of management reforms at local level have offered broadly 
positive conclusions (e.g. Boyle et al, 2003; Callanan, 2005). However, there has been little 
analysis of the impact on specific services such as housing, and where assessments have 
been made they have been based mainly on consultation with stakeholders and 
measurement of outputs (such as services provided) rather than of outcomes. Our research 
did not examine these reforms in sufficient depth to assess their impact on housing services. 
However, it does suggest that some measures have been implemented successfully, but that 
their impact has been more uneven than the aforementioned assessments imply, both 
individually and collectively across different local authorities under examination.  
 
  
 
 
5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The follow-up study of the seven estates has found that advances were made on the estates 
during the years of economic boom. These advances were not uniform across estates, and 
one estate (Moyross) had specific crime and social order problems that counterbalanced 
modest improvements in other areas. Nor were the advances uniform across social 
indicators. For example, improvements in average levels of educational attainment and 
reductions in unemployment in the estates were accompanied by sharp increases in the 
levels of lone parenthood – to the extent that more than half the families in some estates were 
headed by lone parents. Furthermore, even in areas where improvements occurred, they 
were not sufficient to bring the estates up to the level of the national average: their relative 
national standing generally increased little even in areas where their absolute levels 
improved. Fatima Mansions was the only one of the seven estates that showed substantial 
relative as well as absolute improvement – and in that it is similar to a number of other areas 
in Dublin inner city, the only deprived localities in the state where relative improvement was 
recorded in the period since the early 1990s.  
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In the original study in the late 1990s, variation between estates in their broad social 
composition, as measured by the indicators just referred to, was not as wide as the gaps in 
the quality of neighbourhood life revealed by close-up observation. Some estates or parts of 
estates were in high demand among tenants and were well-kept and settled while others were 
unpopular, had high turnover and were in varying degrees of dereliction. Such internal 
diversity within the social housing sector between good quality and poor quality 
neighbourhoods was as striking as the differences between the social housing sector and the 
rest of the housing system. Some of these variations within the sector have since been 
modified by regeneration programmes, as in the case of our study estates where the worst 
instances of poor housing found in the late 1990s have been upgraded. Most notably, the 
total physical demolition and rebuilding of Fatima Mansions and the upgrade in social 
services it received lifted it from the bottom of the quality ladder ten years ago to a relatively 
 
 good position today. The refurbishment of Banks Drive in Cranmore was on a more modest 
scale but nevertheless improved the relative position of that area within the estate, while the 
demolition of the blocks of flats in Deanrock removed the most precarious segment of what 
generally was (and remains) a settled, stable neighbourhood. Today, diversity within and 
between estates can still be found and in the case of Moyross, as outlined earlier, a new 
wave of decline since the early 2000s has affected much of the estate. Otherwise, however, 
the diversity is less extreme than it was in the past and is now as likely to be a side-effect of 
partly-completed regeneration as of localised decline in social conditions – as, for example, in 
the case of Cranmore, where a stalled regeneration programme has left an unsightly pattern 
of boarded-up housing in parts of the estate which previously were in reasonably good 
condition.  
 
It is not possible to pinpoint the causes of the observed changes in the estates. Some 
improvements were a direct benefit of regeneration or improved local services. However, 
regeneration also usually entails a change in the social composition of the resident population 
and some of its benefits could be due to displacement, that is, to the movement of 
problematic tenants out of the area or their failure to gain entry in the first place. In addition, 
much improvement in the estates resulted from maturation or because of the general rise in 
employment and living standards which occurred during the boom but it is difficult to estimate 
how important these factors were or what will happen now that general economic conditions 
have turned sharply downwards. It is particularly difficult to explain differences between the 
trajectories of estates that seemed in a broadly similar position a decade ago, as for example 
in the contrast between Fettercain, which developed reasonably well during the 2000s, and 
Moyross which seemed to be coping with its difficulties ten years ago but suffered from an 
upsurge in violent crime from the early 2000s that seriously destabilised the estate.  
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Our analysis of the area-based initiatives that have constituted the principal policy response 
to the particular disadvantages of deprived neighbourhoods has found that these now 
constitute a major area of public expenditure. In 2006, programmes of this kind amounted to 
some €968.8 million of expenditure, of which €280 million was accounted for by tax 
expenditure aimed at promoting commercial development in run-down parts of cities and 
towns. If we omit these development-oriented tax expenditures and focus only on schemes 
that were intended to benefit poor households directly, the annual spend in 2006 was €688 
 
 million, of which some €295 million was accounted for by programmes that nominally at least 
used quite strict procedures for spatial targeting. The scale and significance of these amounts 
can be indicated by the illustrative estimate that if the €688 million in expenditure intended to 
benefit poor households were concentrated on the 10 per cent of households in the country 
that were most disadvantaged, the average value of those benefits per household in that 
target population would be in the region of €4,681 per year, of which those programmes 
which used the stricter versions of spatial targeting would account for €2,009. This is not to 
imply that spending on these programmes should be converted into cash payments to 
households, but simply to give a rough indication of the scale of funding involved if viewed as 
an intended benefit for poor households. 
 
Analysis of spending estimates under these programmes in four of the estates included in our 
study is generally consistent with these national-level estimates. The estimated average 
spend per household across the four estates in 2006 was €3,096, ranging from a low of €921 
in Deanrock to a high of €3,985 in Moyross. While these estimates of expenditure are 
necessarily crude on a number of counts, they are nevertheless sufficient to indicate that the 
value of this investment is not insignificant, at least in some cases. It is clear, therefore, that 
the question of the coherence and impact of the local schemes funded under these 
programmes is an important one from the point of view of combating disadvantage in 
deprived areas. 
 
Analysis of the coherence and impact of these programmes in the present study, however, 
gives cause for concern. Several individual area-based programmes have been shown in 
independent evaluations to be effective in their own terms, and to provide many instances of 
good practice in specific areas. Some of these positive instances of good practice have been 
realised in the period since our previous study of the seven estates was carried out, and they 
indicate that progress has been made in the range of responses to the problems of 
disadvantaged areas that are available to policy makers. Valuable capacity has been built up 
through these programmes which should serve as a useful resource for communities as they 
attempt to cope with the more challenging conditions now arising as a result of economic 
recession. 
 
94 
 
 Collectively, however, the programmes are less than the sum of their parts. The justification 
for the adoption of area-targeting as a basis for programme planning and delivery is rarely 
made clear, and the degree to which the specific area-targeting mechanisms they utilise are 
efficient or complete is rarely examined but seems questionable in many cases. There is a 
confusing proliferation of programmes and schemes, overall responsibility is fragmented, and 
funding streams and local governance arrangements are overly complex. The multiplicity of 
programmes has hindered their coherent integration into national anti-poverty strategies. It 
has also tended to weaken the status of local government within the wider systems of local 
governance. The programmes are also excessively oriented to inputs and associated 
accounting controls with little systematic orientation to outcomes or to assessments of 
impacts. The funding principles they operate (for example, in regard to the balance between 
capital and current funding) seem to be ad hoc and dependent on larger national budgetary 
priorities rather than the requirements of the problems they seek to address. While in theory 
area-based interventions are said to facilitate local empowerment, adaptation to local 
circumstances and community development, in practice they are often rigidly controlled by 
centrally defined eligibility criteria and accountability regulations. A key weakness in many 
area-targeted programmes is targeting itself. This weakness arises at two levels: (1) 
programmes may have poor methods for selecting localities to be included in their operational 
areas (with the result that some poor areas may be omitted or, as happens more commonly, 
the range of areas to be included extends too widely), and (2) they may have ineffective 
means for distributing the benefits of programmes to the neediest groups within selected 
areas. 
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Many of these problems have been identified in reviews and evaluations of local social 
development programmes conducted since the late 1990s. It is a concern to note that while 
these programmes continued to grow for much of the 2000s, only limited progress has been 
made in tackling the problems identified. Some of the attempted solutions, such as the setting 
up of County Enterprise and Development Boards as a means to integrate local development 
activities, seem simply to have added an additional pillar of complexity to an already over-
complex system. The McCarthy report of 2009, which examined areas where public 
expenditure could be reduced, recommended extensive consolidation of programmes and 
streamlining of delivery systems in the community development field (Special Group on Public 
Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 2009, Vol I:17-18, Vol II:37-9). Actions to 
 
 improve efficiency and enhance impact broadly along the lines McCarthy recommends clearly 
are required. At the same time, however, the current economic crisis is causing the need for 
supportive interventions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods to grow. The present study has 
emphasised the role such interventions can play not just in protecting vulnerable households 
and communities but also in preventing the kinds of housing failure that previously has 
created the need for large-scale and expensive estate regeneration schemes. Therefore, as 
in the case of all social protection expenditure, real need is expanding at present, so that 
while efficiency gains in this field are possible and desirable, these are unlikely to give scope 
for cuts in expenditure that could avoid undermining useful activities on the ground.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
These findings lead to the following recommendations: 
1. Targeting of social programmes on disadvantaged areas has become an over-used 
element of social policy in Ireland and should be scaled back to instances where there is a 
clear rationale and effective methodology for employing this approach. This is not to say 
that expenditure currently devoted to these schemes should equally be cut back, but 
rather that the case for targeting it on areas rather than on disadvantaged groups within 
the population needs to be made in all cases, and where that case is weak, the adoption 
of more traditional distribution mechanisms should be considered.  
2. Possible rationales for area-based programmes are many (efficiency and completeness in 
reaching the poor, the need to ration scarce resources, the desire to combat 
‘neighbourhood effects’ in poor areas, innovation and experimentation in social 
programmes, empowering local communities, etc.). However, in many programmes the 
rationale for adoption of an area-based approach is not clear. For any programme to be 
mounted on a spatial basis, the precise rationale on which it is based needs to be 
specified, the methods by which it will overcome the limitations associated with the area-
based approach should be detailed, and the milestones and ultimate objectives against 
which its success can be judged (i.e. how its success or otherwise can be evaluated) 
should be set out.  
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 3. In considering both rationale and methodology, programmes should not be considered in 
isolation but in terms of their relationship with other programmes and the degree to which 
in combination they amount to an effective means to respond to the spatial aspects of 
social disadvantage. 
4. The structure and governance of area-based programmes could be simplified and greater 
responsibility could be given to local authorities in the local coordination and management 
of programmes. At national level the large number of individual funding programmes 
currently in existence should be amalgamated into a smaller number of more generalist 
schemes, the focus of which reflects the most critical interventions required in poor 
neighbourhoods, such as: childcare, family support, drug treatment services, support for 
vulnerable young people, etc. At local level, responsibility for the distribution and 
monitoring of this funding should be undertaken within the structures of local government. 
In order to improve the capacity of the sector to carry out this function, the Local 
Development Companies which have recently replaced the partnership companies should 
be amalgamated into the City and County Development Board system. The Children’s 
Services Committees now being piloted in four local authorities under the national 
umbrella of the Office of the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs provides a further 
model of local coordination which shows promise and might be replicated in other areas.  
5. Community engagement, local decision-making and local autonomy have been enhanced 
to some degree through area-based interventions, despite continuing limitations in local 
democracy. It is important that gains in these areas are not lost in re-institutionalising 
ABIs. The linkage of ABIs to local government structures and processes and the 
simplification of local governance arrangements could reduce the rigidities that arise from 
existing centralised controls and ease the pressure to ‘chase’ funding from central 
sources. Increased powers of decision-making at local level could thus enhance the 
potential for genuine participation of local civil society. This recommendation is in keeping 
with objectives of empowerment and social inclusion from the grass roots. 
6. A key weakness of spatially targeted programmes is their targeting methods. The spatial 
units to be included in their operational areas are often defined only loosely, if at all, and 
the tendency over time is to extend the spatial scope of programmes, thus reducing the 
intended benefits of targeting since there is then no effective means of ensuring that 
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 programmes reach the neediest groups. The latter weakness – failing to reach the 
neediest – is difficult to overcome because of the wide geographical dispersion of social 
disadvantage. Programmes that utilise spatial targeting, therefore, should be required to 
show that they have good methods for selecting areas, that they have effective means of 
identifying and reaching the neediest within those areas, and that they have means of 
knowing whether and to what degree they have achieved successful outcomes in this 
regard. It is acknowledged that the neediest are often difficult to reach or to draw into 
engagement with services that are designed to support them. More attention may need to 
be given within area-focused initiatives, therefore, to the development of mechanisms to 
secure the participation of the neediest. 
7. The Community Employment scheme is a core element of much of the area-based social 
provision now in place in Ireland. While this scheme has been shown to be ineffective as a 
means of channelling people back into the mainstream labour market (its core nominal 
objective), it has yielded important benefits, both in giving a useful social role to those it 
employs, and in providing staffing support to a wide range of community organisations in 
disadvantaged areas. These aspects of the CE scheme need to be more clearly 
recognised and to be incorporated into the rationale for providing it and the bases on 
which its effectiveness is assessed (i.e. programme evaluation).  
8. Progress made to date in the provision of intensive, high-quality support services for 
acutely disadvantaged households is one of the most positive developments of the past 
decade in services for disadvantage areas. This progress should be sustained and further 
developed. General social inclusion supports and services also need to be adequately 
provided but on their own these are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the needs of the 
minorities of poor households that suffer from acute multiple deprivation. The households 
in question are those in which the usual problems of poverty (low incomes, lack of access 
to jobs, low education, inadequate housing) are compounded by a range of additional 
factors such as poor mental health, drug or alcohol addiction, family disruption, poor 
capacity for parenting, conflict with neighbours, and so on.  
9. The core areas in which these preventive services should be provided are three-fold: 
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 i. Health, particularly in regard to services such as family support, mental health and 
addiction treatment (in view of the high rates of occurrence of these problems 
among acutely disadvantaged households). 
ii. Education, especially for services targeted at those suffering multiple deprivation;  
should be less classroom-based and school-bound than current DEIS services, and 
more effective in reaching out to involve parents, other relatives and the wider 
community as well as children themselves. In addition it is desirable that 
interventions in this area be able to draw on a wider range of skills in dealing with 
extreme disadvantage than are available within the largely pedagogical focus of 
current school-based programmes.  
iii. Criminal justice, especially for effective methods of community policing, with a focus 
on creative responses to young people at risk of running into trouble with the 
criminal justice system (though in some cases also, the requirement extends to 
problems of serious crime). These would include capacity to offer more intensive 
services over a longer period of time where necessary, and more attention to, and 
capacity to engage in, preventive action (e.g. by identifying children at risk earlier, 
structuring interventions around families, etc.). 
9. Examples of good practice in all these areas can now be found in Ireland and instances 
could also be found in the seven estates in our study. The challenge is to build on these 
examples of good practice so that they become mainstream and central parts of the 
social services system rather than scattered examples existing on the margins.  
10. Acutely disadvantaged households should be given high priority in social inclusion policy, 
primarily because they are in extreme need and are therefore entitled to support on 
welfare grounds. But their problems also often have spill-over effects at neighbourhood 
level in the form of various kinds of anti-social behaviour that reduces quality of life for 
those who live around them. These types of ‘neighbourhood effects’ are often the single 
most important source of collective disadvantage in poor communities, over and above 
disadvantages that arise for residents at household level. The role played by the acutely 
disadvantaged in the dynamics of neighbourhood decline in poor areas provides an 
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 important additional justification for giving them a high priority in service provision, in 
addition to the justification that arises from the extreme distress they suffer themselves.  
11. While targeting of services for the disadvantaged on an area basis should be less widely 
used, efforts to combat disadvantage that are focused on the neighbourhood level, such 
as estate regeneration schemes, are necessary and useful in many cases. However, 
these need to avoid excessive focus on capital programmes (refurbishment or 
replacement of dwellings, rehabilitation of the physical environment, provision of 
community buildings) to the neglect of services. Public funding agencies are often more 
willing to provide one-off capital grants (which may be quite large) rather than commit to 
long-term annual services expenditure even where the latter is what is required to 
address key problems in disadvantaged areas. The balance between capital and current 
expenditure in area-based regeneration schemes should be based on well-informed 
diagnosis of what is needed in those areas rather than on a priori preference for capital 
over current expenditure.  
12. Arising from this, the concept of ‘estate regeneration’ needs to be redefined so that it 
gives central place to the development and provision of appropriate services for acutely 
disadvantaged families and individuals. Plans for the delivery and long-term funding of 
these services should be placed at the centre of regeneration schemes and should not be 
left as additions to be tacked on as regeneration schemes get under way.  
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